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1. Introduction
Humans are unique among all social animals with respect to their ability to cooperate in 
sizeable groups. As distinct from other primates we are able to establish evolutionary 
stable cooperation in groups where the number of unrelated individuals surpasses the 
number of related ones. Humans today cooperate in anonymous global markets with 
partners they have never seen before and will probably never see again. And although 
markets repeatedly fail one can assume that this is not the general rule.
So why do we behave the way we do? e scienti"c community commonly agrees on the 
framework leading to the adaption of large scale cooperation in groups of conspeci"cs. 
But there is still no common agreement on which mechanisms eventually lead to this 
behavior. Most prominently two trends can be recognized in the research of the 
mechanics of economic behavior, namely bounded rationality and social preferences.
Research on bounded rational agents is a comparably older approach. Emerging with 
Simon`s (1955) work on a „behavioral model of rational choice“ it is aimed at introducing 
more realistic theories of economic agents  ` decision making processes into orthodox 
economic theory. Taking up the "ndings of psychology of how decision processes in real 
world interactions are executed in humans, behavioral economists concluded that agents 
frequently use non-optimizing procedures when having to choose between diﬀerent 
options instead of calculating probabilities and maximizing utilities in the classic sense. 
Since these procedures are mainly constrained by a lack of information, the time accuracy 
of the decision process or limited search possibilities (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001) these 
agents must be regarded as being by far not as rational as suggested in orthodox economic 
theory. As Kahnemann and colleagues showed, this can mean for example that choosing 
agents usually do not use Bayes  ` rule, a "nding that strongly questions the assumption 
about the monotonicity of preferences (Kahnemann et al., 1982). So much more than 
rational decision making resulting in orthodox optimization behavior it is assumed that 
humans use simpler step-by-step rules, so called heuristics. ese heuristics are adapted 
to particular environments and thus result in fast frugal and accurate choices (Selten, 
2001). 
Although the bounded rationality approach has revealed many shortages of the 
traditional assumptions concerning decision making processes of economic agents, up to 
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today it has failed to establish a theoretic framework for a more accurate economic theory 
of human choice and grounding preferences. e roots of this problem may be twofold. 
First of all bounded rationality as a discipline researching the „proximate mechanisms 
(the heuristics) that animals, humans, institutions, and arti"cial agents use to achieve 
their goals“ (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002, p.10) may just be too broadly de"ned. It is hardly 
imaginable that a discipline that restricts its view on observations of the limitations of 
individual optimization capacities is able to pave the ground for a universal theory of 
individual and collective action. Second and this may even support the previous point 
bounded rationality lacks having a suﬃcient explanatory basis for the detected heuristics.  
Psychology itself as the oldest companion of economics in the "eld of bounded rationality 
failed to associate causes and consequences of the observed behaviors and resulting 
correlations a long time. Only with the rise of evolutionary psychology in the eighties the 
basis for a broader and founded understanding of human behavior was established.
It was this shi to acknowledging the validity of evolutionary biology and anthropology 
that must also be held responsible for the emergence of "rst interdisciplinary research 
projects connecting economics and biology more to each other. 
e social preference approach as introduced in the following work can be seen as an 
epiphenomenon of economists  ` and biologists  ` joint search for the „nature and origin of 
preferences“ (Henrich et al., 2003: 1) of the late nineties. In search of the answer to the 
question what shaped human preferences, and why instead of how human decision 
processes lead to observed outcomes some researchers more and more focussed on the 
core of economic decisioning, namely the ability and motivation to cooperate with 
reference agents. Most generally the principal-agent problem is a problem of failing or 
successful cooperation. In this line of thought research in the area of social preferences 
does not claim to result in a universal theory about the decision process itself but in 
understanding the nature and the extend of human self respectively other regarding 
behavior. As a complementary but by no means substitutional research "eld this branch 
may overcome the two proposed diﬃculties, bounded rationality has to suﬀer from. Its 
focus on just a part of the map of human decision possibilities helps to clarify at least 
some of the ambiguities bounded rationality stressed out in human behavior. And taking 
up pervasive "ndings and hypotheses of evolutionary biology and anthropology it can 
additionally help to build up a proper framework for the evaluation of motivations and 
goals of human decisions. 
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But however today economic research about the roots of sociality seems to be stuck out of 
quite diﬀerent reasons and the interdisciplinary orientation towards evolutionary biology 
turns out to be a mixed blessing (West et al., 2011). 
Up to today research rather resulted in characterizations of the extent of diversity among 
economic agents and corresponding choices than in explanations of the very same. And 
furthermore, some of the main interpretations of social preferences leaning on theories of 
evolutionary anthropology, like the so called „egalitarian preferences“ (Gintis 2009: 70), 
in fact are pervasive but not necessarily correct. Newer research questions like those 
provided by Schmidt (2010) or Camerer and Fehr (2006) reveal that social preference 
theory signi"cantly diverged from the initial premises about human sociality and thus 
runs the risk of failing to capture the essence of what it could be, namely a cohesive theory 
of human cooperation.
is master thesis aims at providing a more complete understanding of what are the 
underlying mechanisms of cooperation and competition and the behavioral transition 
from one to another. Since behavioral economic research about the social preferences of 
economic agents chooses the framework of evolutionary biology the second chapter will 
picture the roots of sociality from an ecologic as well as an evolutionary perspective. is 
will allow mirroring the multiplicity of in&uence factors that shaped and still frame social 
organization and social structure in human societies. As will be shown in this section it is 
furthermore of major importance to highlight the evolution of hierarchies in primates 
and the resulting adaptations in social and especially political behavior. e following 
chapter will deepen the understanding of the mentioned evolved behaviors by reviewing 
the main "ndings of behavioral and experimental economic studies of the last twenty 
years. Aerwards it will be critically evaluated whether these "ndings are reasonable or 
not. As a synthesis of the previous two sections in chapter 4 some structural errors and 
possible misconceptions of social preference theory are stressed out. Following this, a short 
excursus into the reasons for the socioeconomic status (SES) research being stuck in 
"nding an answer to the question why ranks do impinge on health is provided. is is 
done with regard to Occupational Ethology (Wallner et al., 2008) as a presented research 
project aiming at an investigation of the roots of sociality and consequences of lacking 
adaptive abilities towards modern workplace structures of agents. Due to its 
interdisciplinary background, OE is somewhat a convergence point for the diﬀerent 
branches dealing with the mechanisms of failing cooperation and may thus overcome the 
limits social preference theory faces.
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2. Sociality in Primates
“Sociality means group living” 
(Alexander, 1974: 326)
e task of evolutionary biology and especially behavioral ecology is in particular to 
explore the selective forces shaping sociality. As will be seen in the upcoming subchapters, 
sociality or group living is dependent on various variables in all social primate species. 
Nonetheless the upcoming descriptions can only open the door ajar to a profound 
understanding of the interdependencies between natural and sexual selection and 
ecologic pressures. Hamilton (1964) showed that group living even on the nuclear level of 
the family is nothing but cooperation aimed at increasing "tness. Sociality can thus be 
regarded as the ability to organize and cooperate in groups of conspeci"cs. But still 
especially within the non-human primates and apes there is a lot overt competition 
driving out cooperation in many ways. e roots of this competitive behavior diﬀer at 
most between males and females of all species re&ecting diﬀerent needs according to 
"tness maximization.  It is suggested that humans at least in some respect have gained the 
ability to decrease the likelihood of the occurrence of a plenty of those competitive 
situations. Describing the uniqueness of humans  `adaptive abilities which "nds its peak in 
large scale cooperation in contemporary societies will thus end the evolutionary 
examination of the roots of human sociality from an evolutionary perspective.
Behavioral economists usually take the presented hypothesis about primate and thus 
human sociality as given. In this regard it is necessary to understand how external 
in&uences have shaped social hierarchies and to what style of living humans are adapted 
to if one wants to critically assess the state of the art in this branch as done in chapter 4. 
Since economic trade and resulting principal agent problems must be regarded as a 
speci"c form of successful or failing cooperation aimed at maximizing "tness, knowing 
about individual motivations and in&uencing factors to interact in frameworks where 
resources are acquired and reallocated might help sharpening the proposed traits of 
economic agents. 
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2.1 An Evolutionary Approach towards Sociality
e "rst profound exploration of Primate Societies started as a result of expansive "eld 
works in the 50’s and 60’s. Anthropologists’ focus since then was mainly motivated by the 
possibility to reveal the foundations of human sociality (Kinzey, 1987). e exploration of 
primates’ behavior in their natural habitats was and still is therefore a very important 
instrument. In contrast to captured populations the "eldwork yields insights of mammals’ 
lives in a surrounding where social and ecological pressures interact (Strier, 2007). In 
reference to the human political spectrum one can therefore either account for diﬀerent 
cooperative and coordinative habits in the numerous social mammal species or choose to 
restrict the view to the closest human relatives, primates. 
e restricted choice of species of the hominoid spectrum as well as macaques and 
baboons as representatives of the cercopithecines in my work will allow mirroring the 
diversity of sociality and its variance at least to some extend. With respect to their highly 
developed complex social structures and the broad spectrum of cooperative strategies 
non-human primates and apes may also allow further insights into the hominid patterns 
of behavior. Additionally as recent studies showed the gene structure of macaques is still 
quite analogous to the hominid one matching with 93.5% (Gibbs et al., 2007). So although 
our last common relative lived around 25 million years ago analogies of at least some 
innate behavioral strategies can be supposed. 
As can be seen in the referred works many authors use some terms especially the ones 
de"ning social systems like social organization, mating style or social structure not 
congruently along or consequently among diﬀerent publications. us the aerwards 
used terms are de"ned with reference to Kappeler and Van Schaik (2001).
2.2. Sociality in Non-Human Primates
e evolutionary nature of the issue requires to begin by referring to the social systems of 
humans closest relatives, namely non-human primates. 
Primates are mainly distributed to the tropical regions of Africa, Asia and South America. 
But the spatial variance of the environments is extreme according to the diﬀerent climatic 
distinctions in these regions. us habitats include not just tropical forests but also open 
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woodlands, savannas, mountainous highlands or mangrove forests and swamps (Strier, 
2007, Boyd and Silk, 2009). e structural diﬀerences of biogeography strongly induce the 
dimensions primates’ habitats. Prosimians with haunts being limited to tropical 
rainforests to a large extent can be characterized as arboreal species. With the increasing 
diversity of inhabited areas in which most Old World monkeys are located in by contrast 
the lifestyle switches over to semiterrestrial or terrestrial living (Strier, 2007) decreasing 
the complexity of the environment in its spatial dimensions signi"cantly. e 
consequences of the diﬀerent lifestyles manifest at a "rst instance in distinct activity 
patterns. While most Prosimians are supposed to be nocturnal the selected anthropoid 
species are just like all other of this spectrum diurnal. Being active at day and not at night 
is one major magnitude of in&uence to further diﬀerences in lifestyles of primates. 
Individual adaptations to this lifestyle range from larger body sizes and increased visual 
orientation to higher demands concerning the complexity of social specialization. e 
decreased complexity of the habitats’ dimensionality is therefore replaced by higher 
demands in social organization.
2.2.1 Sociality as Response to Ecologic Pressures
“Much of the day-to-day life of primates is driven by two concerns: getting enough 
to eat and avoiding being eaten” (Boyd and Silk, 2009: 127).
e reasons for sociality in Primate species are complex. Today the explanatory basis 
mainly refers to individual advantages in avoiding predators (Van Schaik and Van 
Noordwijk, 1985), foraging bene"ts for individuals in larger social groups (Eisenberg et 
al., 1972), and enhanced absolute reproductive success (Silk et al., 2003). According to the 
foraging bene"ts associated to increasing group sizes on the organizational level the main 
arguments deal with a proposed higher discovery rate of food resources, a reduced 
variation in individual intake rate and the ability to prevail over smaller-group 
incumbents competing for scarce resources (Janson, 1992).
While those bene"ts are usually not part of a critical assessment anymore, the eventual 
costs of larger group foraging indeed are. First, food is a scarce resource being exclusive in 
its consumption and primates usually do not share. But not surprisingly the availability of 
enough food considerably impinges on the metabolic processes, growth rate, and 
reproductive eﬀort (Boyd and Silk, 2009). Second as Clutton-Brock (1974) hypothesized, 
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group size is correlated to the availability of productive patches, allowing larger groups 
emerging in habitats with quantitatively and qualitatively higher resource allocation (see 
also Mori, 1979). But as White and Wrangham (1988) point out, this correlation is not to 
be generalized. Adding one individual to groups with maximal size yields to a signi"cant 
decline in the average intake of energy. Increasing group sizes in consequence always lead 
to signi"cant increases in individual costs. e inevitably following elevated intra-group 
competition for food can lead to a decrease in female reproduction rates and increases in 
mortality rates in the society (Dittus, 1979, Whitten, 1983). So the question if outcomes 
being balanced out by structural processes like intra- versus intergroup competition 
(Wrangham, 1980) result in net costs or net bene"ts still remains open.
ird as Janson (1992) points out, the opportunity costs of increased foraging eﬀorts are 
not well de"ned and rarely predictable. As will referred to later especially cooperation in 
food acquisition and sharing reward social interactions in form of prosocial behaviors. 
ese behaviors are not just essential for the emergence of high-level cooperation but also 
to a substantial degree part of daily routine in most primate species. Costly outweighing 
eﬀects thus can be assumed herein. 
Another root for primate sociality can be found in the prospect of minimizing the risk of 
predation, an opinion held most prominently by Alexander (1974) and van Schaik and 
Noordwijk (1985). Although there are not much data to support the main assumptions 
with hard facts there seems to be a consensus about especially two bene"cial results of 
sociality, the vigilance and the dilution eﬀect (Janson, 1992). While the former bene"t is 
just as it is with the detection of new resources guided at the degree of informational 
openness of groups with respect to size in detecting predators. e latter one is an 
expression for a decrease in the probability of being subject to a predatory attack when 
group population is becoming more densely. Evidence for both eﬀects and their proposed 
in&uence in favoring sociality can be found in Van Schaik (1983) and others. Since one 
cannot control for external factors and rarely exclude them in "eldwork, results in this 
regard may be signi"cantly biased. Besides the problem of correlations to aspects of food 
acquisition as factors for diﬀerent spatial characteristics "eld studies yet do not provide 
enough data to answer the question why the proposed bene"ts of growing group size 
outweigh the costs inherent to an increasing probability of being detected by predators.
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2.2.2 Social Organization and Mating Systems
While the proposed mechanisms do oﬀer probable explanations for the emergence of 
simple sociality and its’ anchoring in primate populations they do neither oﬀer reasonable 
guidance towards the observable versatility in the organization of the social spectrum nor 
give hints about inherent physical boundaries framing the extent to which sociality is 
possible. 
Usual approaches that try to explain this variability deal with the occurrence of spillover 
eﬀects or “complex feedback loops” (Kappeler and Van Schaik, 2002: 708) between social 
organization, social structures and social mating systems that in fact turn out to be quite 
eclectic. In&uences that are referred to by authors in this context like spatial relationships 
between group members, territoriality of the populations or within-group aggressive 
behavior (Janson, 1992) indeed are important, but they are as well highly correlated to the 
above mentioned arguments for the occurrence of other pro-social behaviors itself. 
Disentangling the diﬀerent mechanics would thus exceed the scope of this work by far. 
With regard to the composition and the spatiotemporal cohesion, the variability of 
primate societies on the organizational level can be mirrored by the multiple possible 
lifestyles of the social mating system spectrum. A vital categorical distinction in here is 
whether it induces females and males to live solitary, pair-bonding or in groups (Kappeler 
and van Schaik, 2002). e resulting social mating systems for solitary females can be 
classi"ed as monogamous-, polygynous- or polyandrous group-living (see "gure 1).
In each of these systems females maintain personal home ranges while males either pair-
bond, monopolize territories of multiple female habitats solitary, or cooperatively share 
separated groups of perceptive females and their oﬀspring. Females sharing habitats with 
other mature females form either social one-male polygynous or multi-male polygynous 
groups. 
In general, excluding many interspeci"c variations of the diﬀerent species, 
cercopithecines typically live in multifemale-multimale groups in which dispersal is 
biased towards males (Melnick and Pearl, 1987). e hominoid spectrum towards 
sociality diﬀers signi"cantly in many ways. Varying mating styles throughout the various 
species holds the key to many observable diﬀerences in groups’ social structures. e 
social mating styles in here range from solitary living, polyandry to polygynous "ssion-
fusion groups including dispersal and second stage emigration of both genders (Boyd and 
Silk, 2009).
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What one can say with regard to many explanations for the occurrence of social 
relationships among group members is that they are in most cases directed at explaining 
male-female or male-male relationships but not grouping strategies and their roots in 
female individuals (Wrangham, 1987). It is straight forward that sociality must be an 
optimal response towards ecologic pressures, guaranteeing high reproduction ratios in 
this framework. But the question how on the other side mating systems do in&uence 
sociality again is in most cases not answered satisfactory. And the styles of the diﬀerent 
species are in some regard the signposts for further studies leading to the organizational 
level of sociality in primates. By focusing on the social organization of primate groups, 
besides predation and food acquisition (Boyd and Silk, 2009) the mating style, especially 
the way in which oﬀspring is raised and mating partners are selected is the in&uential 
variable. Its occurrence can be seen as a “compromise between female and male strategies 
to gain access to mates, food and other resources that they and their oﬀspring need to 
survive […] and vary with ecological and demographic conditions” (Strier, 2007: 141). 
In its broadest sense diﬀerent mating systems lead to the question which sexes turn out to 
be philopatric, a factor having a big impact on social organization. Many Old World 
primate species and nearly all social Prosimians show patterns of female philopatry, and 
Figure 1: Classi"cation of societal arrangements regarding male and 
female residency of mating styles. e sex symbols`s size gives hints 
about the degree of sexual dimorphism (Boyd and Silk, 2009: 142)
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dispersal as well as secondary emigration is signi"cantly biased towards mature males 
minimizing the risk of incest and modifying size indirectly by changing the operational 
sex ratio (Pusey and Packer, 1987, Strier, 2007, Kappeler and van Schaik, 2002, Mitani et 
al., 1996). And although especially throughout the hominoid spectrum female individuals 
show a higher variability in dispersal patterns nepotism needs not inevitably to be 
precluded. e probability that dispersing mature females live together with kin again and 
show signi"cant levels of nepotism is quite high (Watts, 1996) even if this is not because 
of coalitionary dispersal of kin (Stewart and Harcourt, 1987).
Wrangham hypothesized that this is due to increases in the direct "tness of individuals. In 
his view, females’ "tness is in the "rst instance not limited by the number of potential 
mating partners but by the availability of resources providing enough energy for raising 
oﬀspring (Wrangham, 1980). Since the ovulatory status is highly dependent on the 
nutritional status of females limiting perceptiveness strongly (Strier, 2007) in distinction 
compared to males where the probability to maximize "tness is in the "rst instance 
reached in groups where there are as many perceptive females to mate with as possible 
(due to the usual lack of support in raising oﬀspring) (Trivers, 1972), food occurrence or 
access is the driving force behind female sociality. 
is diﬀerence in the character of social pressures (Wrangham, 1987) stress out female 
sociality as the more important object of study at this point.
High-level resources aﬀect growth, maturing, and perception intervals (Boyd and Silk, 
2009, Lee, 1996). So generally optimal group size and sex composition according to 
ecological constraints is hypothesized to be the framework for female reproductive 
strategies and within aspects of social organization. In consequence females are more 
likely to behave nepotistic in larger groups. Especially females living in multi-male, multi-
female groups consisting of their oﬀspring and mature female kin are more likely to 
behave nepotistic, in&uencing the prospect of reaching or maintaining optimal group size 
by being able to regulate it actively via accepting immigration of non-resident males (Silk, 
2006). Female groups are in many cases matrilinear organized and re&ect in size and 
composition the outweighed bene"ts of defending common food resources or 
minimizing the prospect of being target of a predatory attack (Cluttonbrock and Harvey, 
1977, Kappeler and van Schaik, 2002, Wrangham, 1980) and costs of sometimes severe 
intragroup competition for food (Strier et al., 2006, Crockett and Janson, 2000). More 
recent studies bearing upon the Social Brain Hypothesis by Dunbar (1998) oﬀer insights 
into probable cognitive constraints on the magnitude of group living (Dunbar, 1992, 
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Dunbar, 1998, Kudo and Dunbar, 2001). According to the social brain hypothesis the size 
of the neocortex in social mammals, especially in primates is highly correlated to group 
size, a factor providing information about the upper boundaries of diﬀerent species’ social 
abilities with respect to the number of possible interaction partners. 
Consequently regardless whether the social brain is cause or consequence of constrained 
sociality in male or female primates from an evolutionary perspective its limiting function 
is fundamental.
Summarizing at this point, optimal group size is limited by three main variables on the 
organizational level: ecologic pressures like resource availability in a spatiotemporal 
context limiting the maximum group size, ecologic pressures like predation or intergroup 
competition determining the lower bounds of group size, and cognitive constraints 
limiting maximal group size even in absence of certain ecological eﬀects. is high 
variability in the in&uences on group size across primate species is mirrored by the extent 
to which they diﬀer in the number of conspeci"cs, ranging from small groups (Pongo 
pygmea) to larger ones (eropitecus gelada) (Chapman and Chapman, 2000).
2.2.3 Social Structure
Leaving aside some of the numerous potential in&uences on the framework of group 
organization mentioned above according to the appearance of primate social behavior the 
intra-speci"c dependencies of living turn out to be eclectic. As already mentioned, 
optimal group size and composition result from the struggle between diﬀerent ecological 
pressures, namely food acquisition, avoidance of predatory attacks and maximizing 
individual reproductive success. But according to the inherent mechanistic mode of 
operation especially according to cohesion and nepotistic agitation in groups these 
pressures seem to be passive framer rather than active shaper.
is question of structure as a distinct feature of sociality provides deeper insights into 
the relationships of individuals. e driving force shaping social structure is dominance 
“producing marked inequalities in access to resources” (Sapolsky, 2005) and implicating 
diﬀerent sets of behavioral strategies. ese sets are in the following speci"ed as agonistic 
behavioral traits that equilibrate sociality in the "eld of intra-group resource competition, 
social integration and coexistence (De Waal, 1987a).
Leaning on Walters and Seyfarth (1987) the concept of dominance in animals was already 
introduced by Schjelderup-Ebbe (1935) who showed that agonistic encounters between 
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chickens were predictable in dyadic disputes. ese outcomes of diﬀerent aggressive 
interactions between chickens draw a picture of a linear transitive hierarchy rooted in and 
manifested through encounters between dyads of animals holding these diﬀerent ranks 
(Walters and Seyfarth, 1987). Today, especially in the context of primates  ´performance of 
aggressive or intimidating behaviors (Sapolsky 2005) a dominance relationship can be 
de"ned as one way to harmonize and an predict possible further con&icts and their 
directions (De Waal, 1987a) that did not evolve through disappearance of competitive and 
aggressive tendencies in primate behavior, but through the development of powerful 
mechanisms of con&ict resolution (De Waal, 1987a). 
In particular the hierarchy can be seen as a strong mechanism itself. Abstracting the strict 
resource view (Harcourt, 1987, Van Schaik and Van Noordwijk, 1988, Isbell, 1991) to a 
broader concept of the distribution of resource-dependent variables dominance 
relationships exert in&uence on a set of variables such as mating patterns (Boyd and Silk, 
2009, Hausfater, 1975), social bonding (Dunbar, 1988), grooming distribution patterns 
(Seyfarth, 1977) or “grooming markets” (Noe and Hammerstein, 1995) and mortality 
rates (Boyd and Silk, 2009, Struhsacker, 1987, Pusey et al., 1997). Con&icts thus can result 
as a consequence of direct competition for resources and indirect competition through 
ritualized encounters that are rank related and usually do not involve extreme forms. 
Estimations about the ratio of these two forms suggest that around 75% are due to 
maintaining the status quo of the rank in the dominance hierarchy itself. is 
replacement of "erce con&icts through dominance and submission suggests that the 
maintenance of dominance through ritualized strategic interaction is economically 
eﬃcient, minimizing individual costs in the framework of potentially excessive intra-
group competition (Walters and Seyfarth, 1987). 
e extent to which dominance is manifested as well as its appearance again strongly 
varies throughout the primate social spectrum showing signi"cant biases according to 
spatiotemporal contexts (Sapolsky, 2004). e focus on the style (De Waal and Luttrell, 
1989) as a way capturing the “inherent agonistic asymmetry in relationships and the 
degree of expressed […] asymmetry” (Flack and de Waal, 2004: 159) of the diﬀerent 
species unveils an enormous range in the "eld of hierarchies. Besides the fact that 
dominance styles vary between male and female groups of the numerous primate species 
-a fact that will be referred to later- diﬀerences can also be found on the inter- and intra-
society level of the same species and in behavioral strategies underlying those structures 
(Flack and de Waal, 2004, Boehm, 1999, Sapolsky, 2004). In general the most common 
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distinction for dominance styles in social animals as suggested by Vehrencamp (1983) is a 
continuum ranging from egalitarian (Evans-Pritchard, 1940), relaxed and or tolerant to 
despotic dominance styles (Flack and de Waal, 2004). 
A crucial distinction that has to be made within this context is the concentration of overt 
aggression. Besides the already mentioned distinction of direct and indirect aggression 
with respect to resource acquisition, following Vehrencamp the relevant agonistic 
behaviors have to be evaluated with respect to their absolute concentration on a very few 
dominant individuals (Boehm, 1999). Leaving aside the structure of behaviors on the 
nuclear level this asymmetry (Flack and de Waal, 2004) reveals on the one hand in a 
direct and simple way how strong dominance is exerted or maintained and 
monopolization of resources is enlarged. On the other hand one can derive that the 
degree of despotism strongly interacts with group size and group cohesion. is may for 
example be one reason why harem polygyny in promiscuous breeders is usually limited to 
4 perceptive females and that this group structure is not necessarily spatiotemporally 
consistent (Janson, 1992, Hrdy, 1974, Dunbar, 1988). So even if the direction of 
aggression or intimidation is opposed in two diﬀerent societies (intra- vs. extra-group 
aggression) both dominance styles may be put at one end of the Vehrencamp scale near 
the despotic extreme. As long as the concentration of dominant behavior is directed at 
monopolizing resources despotism may be regarded as high in both cases. 
Applying the same line of thought the features of extra-group aggression do not 
necessarily imply that some species’ dominance style may not be relaxed. Although 
relaxed societies always show a reduced concentration of agonistic behaviors guided at 
monopolizing resources in an intra-group context, individual dominance and submissive 
behavior as well as pronounced inter-group aggression can be listed as characteristics 
(Boehm, 1999). ese examples reveal Vehrencamp’s continuum as a relationship concept 
that has to be strictly dissociated from corresponding concepts in the social sciences. 
While nearly all primate species show pronounced dominance behaviors on the nuclear 
level and with reference to mature female individuals egalitarianism needs not to be 
excluded.
According to the diﬀerences in the dominance behavior in males and females the usual 
explanatory basis is again rooted in maximizing individual "tness. e main reason for 
the existence of female hierarchies can therefore still be seen in feeding competition while 
on the other side hierarchies of male primates are a result of asymmetric access to 
perceptive females. Male and female dominance hierarchies can thus be regarded as being 
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separated (Packer and Pusey, 1979) to some extend an assumption that eases the 
examination of the diﬀerent styles in primate species. 
Males in nearly all species of the primate spectrum do dominate females but agonistic 
interactions resulting in these intersexual relationships are comparably less marked 
although intra- and inter-sex variations may occur with respect to female estrus cycles 
(Kappeler and van Schaik, 2002, Smuts and Smuts, 1993, Smuts, 1985). 
As a result of intrasexual selection (Boyd and Silk, 2009) in most primate species males’ 
strength, size as well as "ghting abilities do play a signi"cant role in the acquirement of 
ranks in hierarchies while these traits are not signi"cantly implied in the obtainment of 
females ranks (Walters and Seyfarth, 1987). Male relationships are nearly always 
characterized by increased competition for receptive females. In many cases the resulting 
social styles of multimale groups can thus be ranged at the despotic side of the 
Vehrencamp continuum. Dominance relationships in here are transitive and usually 
linear although especially coalitionary agitation may hinder structure to seem clearly 
despotic. Coalitionary support is sometimes seen as a trigger for egalitarianism (Kappeler 
and van Schaik, 2002, Strier, 2007, Boehm, 1999, Sapolsky, 2005), but with regard to social 
power as de"ned by Flack and de Waal (2004) this may be confusing. 
Male-male competitive behavior and the resulting dominance styles in cercopithecine are 
very variable. While rank acquaintance is in sometimes age reversed in multi-male groups 
this need not to be a general rule (Smuts, 1985).
Since male baboons and macaques usually do monopolize breeding in the harem scenario 
and direct "erce aggression towards incumbents these species must be placed at the 
despotic side of the Vehrencamp continuum. Others again show no such pronounced 
dominance behaviors (Flack and de Waal, 2004). Whether strategy spaces of male 
cercopithecine species contain behaviors that seem more relaxed or not, egalitarianism 
used as a term characterizing male dominance styles (Matsumura, 1999) might end up in 
confusion. If at all some baboon and macaque species may be noted as being more 
relaxed while most are certainly despotic (Flack and de Waal, 2004).
Female relationships tend to be more nepotistic in groups where females philopatry is the 
rule. e corresponding social structures are temporally highly consistent with 
pronounced linearity although the degree of exerted dominance is by no means as 
despotic or despotic at all in comparison to the numerous male-male relationships. 
Whenever on the other hand females do disperse the tendency to establish time-
consistent hierarchies declines.
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Especially in multi-female groups female philopatry is suggested to induce tight 
matrilinear hierarchy styles (Silk, 2007). Within the group, mothers always outrank all 
daughters. Female kin in these cases usually acquire the rank just below their mother 
when they get older. A stepwise decrease in the rank of immature female kin is associated 
with newer born maturing siblings, a strategy leading to the occurrence of linear ranking 
inversed to the age structure of the group (Silk, 2001). Outside the group all females of 
one matriline outrank the members of matrilineages being subordinate. e acquisition 
and maintenance of the dominance ranks is mainly due to high tendencies to form 
coalitions between mothers and their daughters although this may not be true in all cases 
(Matsumura, 1999). Mothers even support their immature oﬀspring in agonistic con&icts 
such that it is possible that juveniles outcompete mature females in agonistic intragroup-
con&icts (Walters and Seyfarth, 1987). In Macaques and Baboons female primates’ ranks 
seem to be quite consistent over time, suggesting that mature females in many cases loose 
the acquired rank not until the end of their life (Boyd and Silk, 2009, Walters and 
Seyfarth, 1987). Dominance styles herein can diﬀer extremely. ey range from more 
relaxed styles to highly despotic styles (japanese macaques) (Matsumura, 1999, Sapolsky, 
2005).
roughout the hominid species where female philopatry is anything but common the 
dominance styles still do not diﬀer signi"cantly. Female bonobos living in large multi-
male multi-female "ssion-fusion communities disperse with maturity. Nonetheless 
females exert strong dominance behaviors in female hierarchies and tend to form 
powerful coalitions (de Waal, 1995). As a result in bonobo groups there may exist co-
dominance of genders (Wrangham and Peterson, 1996) in particular alpha males and 
alpha females both involved in female coalitions. Although the extent to which 
dominance is exerted in agonistic interactions is not as extreme as in other species, the 
coalitionary power underpinning the rank of some individuals may be seen as another 
form of concentration of dominance and thus characterize bonobo females’ hierarchies as 
semi-despotic (Boehm, 1999).
Female chimpanzees live in groups being quite comparable to those of bonobos on the 
organizational level. Just as the males female chimpanzees do organize in parties, 
subgroups that are temporarily unstable and constantly change their composition. 
Although female chimpanzees are dominated by all mature males in dyadic interactions 
such that there is no alpha female of the whole community hierarchies in female groups 
are common. Agonistic con&icts are less "erce than in male chimpanzees but the political 
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power exerted by female coalitions on the macro-level of the community may be 
deciding. Females’ coalitions are in consequence sometimes even involved in the rivalry 
of males for a higher status impinging on the results of agonistic con&icts (Boehm, 1999). 
Although power in female individuals in chimpanzee societies is not that concentrated 
the correlation between female rank and reproductive success (Pusey et al., 1997) is 
signi"cant. Furthermore newer studies may have found evidence for at least some 
linearity in females’ hierarchies (Wittig and Boesch, 2003).
e occurrence of certain epiphenomena (linearity of hierarchies, coalitionary agitation) 
accompanying status rivalry, induce that dominance plays a role in chimpanzee female 
hierarchies. is may characterize them as being comparably relaxed. e question if 
structures can be described as being looser than in male hierarchies (Boehm, 1999, 
Stumpf, 2007) is, with respect to the higher political power exerted by female coalitions 
problematic.
In the patrilocal societies of chimpanzees and bonobos mature males structure in 
dominance hierarchies. Grouping in parties is well-marked especially chimpanzee males 
leading to higher ratios of intra-group associations. In chimpanzee societies the alpha 
male controls the group, agonistic interactions oen caused by the alpha (Muller, 2002) 
are rank related to a vast extent, and every mature male dominates every mature female 
(Wrangham and Peterson, 1996). e hierarchies show pronounced linearity and 
transitivity (Stumpf, 2007). In bonobos on the other side and as already mentioned 
societies consist of co-dominant individuals and male hierarchies are rarely linear or 
transitive. Much of male dominance is due to coalitionary support from female subgroups 
that are kin related (Nishida and Hiraiwa-Hasagewa, 1987). Since bonobos do not aﬃliate 
in male coalitions political power is not skewed towards alpha males (Boehm, 1999). With 
regard to social power the diﬀerences between male bonobos and male chimpanzees may 
not seem that distinctive. But according to direct rank related intergroup-aggression 
territorial behavior patterns in chimpanzees contrast from bonobos explicitly. 
Chimpanzees are highly territorial a feature including lethal raiding of competing 
neighbor groups (Wrangham, 1999). is feature of chimpanzee behavioral strategies is 
exceptional and suggests chimpanzee males to be very despotic and bonobos to be semi-
despotic.
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2.3 Sociality in Humans
Primates show pronounced and highly complex pro-social behaviors. is is a key fact 
distinguishing these species from most other mammals and going far beyond the 
concepts of competition through aggression in agonistic, dyadic interactions (Lewin and 
Foley, 2004). e underlying strategies are so wide-ranging and variable that it is nearly 
impossible to deduce the patterns and rules of human behavior thereof. Human 
behavioral strategies themselves are a good example for a degree of adaptability that 
makes it hardly possible to derive anything more from it than that humans are indeed 
quite adaptive. 
So even without using the sometimes hypothetic evolutionary dynamics, and with 
reference to primate societies diﬀering mechanisms for sociality in humans one can "nd 
many diverse social organizations, structures, and styles only in the homo spectrum. A 
good summary for this diversity already on the nuclear level of human mating strategies is 
provided by Boyd and Silk (2009):
“During the "rst half of the twentieth century, cultural anthropologists fanned out 
across the world to study the lives of exotic peoples. eir hard and sometimes 
dangerous work has given us an enormous trove of information about the 
spectacular variety of human lifeways. ey found that domestic arrangements 
vary greatly across cultures: some groups are polygynous, some monogamous, and 
a few polyandrous. Some people reckon descent through the female line and are 
subject to the authority of their mother’s brother. In some societies, married 
couples live with the husband’s kin, in others they live with the wife’s kin, and in 
some they set up their own households. Some people must marry their mother’s 
brothers’ children; others are not allowed to do so.” (Boyd and Silk, 2009: 424)
According to Dunbar the investigation of the roots of human sociality can occur in three 
ways: 
1) the extraction of analogies between nonhuman primates and extinct hominids 
2) a comparison of living primate species aimed at extrapolating general rules and 
mechanisms of behavioral patterns
3) modeling populations’ evolution in varying environments when certain behavioral 
strategies are constrained (Dunbar, 2001).
While the "rst way although being the most prominent one throughout the last 30 years is 
supposed to confuse rather than ease the attempt of disentangling the possible behaviors 
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of hominids, whether extinct or not. e other two approaches may be helpful and oﬀer 
better guidance in current research (Dunbar, 2001). It is not surprising that recent 
hypothesis about sociality and social complexity in primate species are products of the 
latter two approaches. By comparing group size in multiple mammal species with 
neocortex size of the associated individuals Dunbar (1998) weighty in&uenced the shi 
towards an investigation of the “Man the Social Animal” (Lewin and Foley, 1998: 220). 
And by modeling evolutionary dynamics of reciprocity in sizeable groups to cite only one 
newer example, Gintis (2000) oﬀered insights into constraints that may have framed and 
shaped reciprocity.
Human sociality today is varying strongly even when compared to the social styles found 
in the primate spectrum. It is commonly assumed that this must be due to ecologic 
pressures framing sociality in its foundations. While this assumption is true for the 
general mode of existence of sociality in humans this is only part of the explanatory basis 
for the huge diversity of societies with reference to its structures. 
First hominins probably lived in patrilocal polygynous groups. Sexual dimorphism of our 
extinct ancestors was highly marked leading to the assumption that intra-group 
competition in the multimale scenario lead to enhanced intrasexual selection (Boyd and 
Silk, 2009, Wrangham, 2001). It can be assumed that dominance styles were comparable 
to those of chimpanzees (De Waal, 2001). Estimations about the group sizes of extinct 
hominini in comparison to chimpanzees assume around 60 individuals in 
Australopithecine groups, a number steadily increasing throughout the diﬀerent homo 
species up to 150 in modern human groups compared to chimpanzees where 55 
individuals can be assumed on average in a society (Dunbar, 2001). Since the features of 
sociality in the early hominini according to structure, organization and mating styles do 
not diﬀer signi"cantly from those of non-human primates the question arises how and 
why distinct human sociality and the enormous adaptive potential inherent to it arose.
2.3.1 e Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness
“Human nature consists of a mixture of ancient mammalian traits, 
general primate traits, and speci"c traits exhibited by hominoids”. 
(Boehm, 1999: 12)
e Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA) (Barkow et al., 1992) is referred to as 
the transition phase in the hominid evolution ranging from 1.8 million years (lower 
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Pleistocene) to 10.000 (upper Pleistocene) before present. is phase is characterized by 
many climate changes that forced socially and technologically developed humans to adapt 
to changing environments and establish living in mobile small-scale foraging societies 
(Boyd and Silk, 2009). Today’s foraging societies are supposed to be a structural 
equivalent to societies of the EEA and are thus oen referred to by many authors (Kaplan 
et al., 2000, Boehm, 1993).
It is important to note at this point that the term adaptation in this regard may lead to 
confusion. As Wrangham states the degree of sexual dimorphism, absolute body size, as 
well as many other physical characteristics did not undergo signi"cant changes in humans 
throughout the last 2 million years. He hypothesizes that this may in consequence imply 
that all humans in this period faced the same “basic system of social ecology and sexual 
selection” (Wrangham, 2001: 143). If this theory is correct adaptations in this context are 
rather based on changing patterns of sociality than on “conserved” morphologies.
is focus on factors in&uencing social abilities in humans is even underlined when 
regarding the development of the brain size in mammals throughout the last 3 million 
years, the only factor that underwent signi"cant changes in hominins. Dunbar (2001) 
argues that hominins average brain size in this period increased from about 400 cc 
(Australopithecus africanus) to 1350 cc (Homo sapiens). Since brain size inducing 
behavioral strategy variability through “learning, cognition, and insight” (Kaplan, 
Lancaster and Hurtado, 2000: 156) is the only major measurable morphologic diﬀerence 
and ecologic pressures did not impact on this change, again as stated above, questions 
about this “human nature” can rarely be answered homologous to the non-human 
primate spectrum.
Brain size is highly correlated to especially two key features, the mother’s metabolic rate 
and the length of the gestation period . While the gestation period for humans is with 
about 270 days comparable to the ones of hominoids, there are signi"cant diﬀerences 
according to body size to brain ratio of the newborns. Human newborns’ brain- and body 
sizes are in comparison to anthropoid species around two times as large and grow 
throughout their lifespan to a size that is 3 ½ times bigger. e total energy devoted for 
fetal oﬀspring as well for the maturing juvenile thus must be markedly higher in humans 
than in anthropoid species. e same must then also hold for the metabolic rate of the 
mothers (Lewin and Foley, 2004).
roughout their lifespan the brain to body ratio signi"cantly skews. Mature humans 
have brains that are three times as large as the ones of anthropoid monkeys and apes 
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while exhibiting comparable body sizes on average. It is straight forward that when body 
sizes of mature individuals are equal while brain sizes diﬀer, much of the total energy 
devoted for brain growth must be skewed toward in humans. is is especially true with 
respect to the fact that brains of newborn humans undergo a one-year postnatal period of 
rapid growth expanding the gestation period to 21 months and that higher intelligence 
implies longer periods of valuable learning (Lewin and Foley, 2004).
e metabolic rate of the mother can therefore only be one aspect that has to be 
accompanied by a suﬃcient supply of high energetic food resources for the maturing 
oﬀspring. Consequently selective pressures towards increasing brain sizes must have been 
promoted by abilities to guarantee relatively constant high energetic food supply. Whether 
this supply through abilities is rooted in drastic changes in the diet (Carmody and 
Wrangham, 2009) or not it is obvious that more complex patterns of social abilities matter 
at this point.
Most generally three points seem to be quite in&uential here, a change in food 
composition, the evolution of long-term bonding between males and females and labor 
division between sexes (Kaplan, Lancaster and Hurtado, 2000). While bonding can be 
seen as maximizing "tness behavior on the individual level of males since dependencies 
of mothers and their oﬀspring increase for a longer period, the other two points seem to 
be more crucial for human evolution in the EEA. Higher energetic demands must yield 
higher energetic supply. If maximum supply is held constant throughout the Pleistocene, a 
relaxing assumption with respect to rapid climate changes in this period, higher demand 
can only be saturated by an increasing eﬃciency in food acquaintance or food re"nement.
A comparison of food acquisition in chimpanzees and humans oﬀers insights into the 
grounding mechanisms of proposed eﬃciency gains. In chimpanzee populations collected 
foods take up the hugest amount of time spent for feeding. Extracted and hunted foods as 
a consequence do not make it up to more than 5% of feeding time on average. In human 
foraging societies on the other side most of the diet is either hunted (animal game) or 
extracted (tubers) while collected foods are less important (Boyd and Silk, 2009; Kaplan, 
Lancaster and Hurtado, 2000).
is change in the composition and quantity of food available strikes out hunted and 
extracted foods as main food sources. Hunting for large game as one major calorie 
supplier to this extend must have been performed collectively in the EEA. Furthermore 
re"ned hunting and gathering techniques aﬀord time seeking learning eﬀort yielding in 
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specialization. And since immature oﬀspring in humans is highly dependent for years a 
sexual division of work might have been established in the EEA (Rubin, 2002).
Boyd and Silk (2009) run an example underlining the probability of the assumption of 
collective hunting. While this example is leaned at the “stag hunt” game motivated by 
Rousseau the authors diﬀer in their model in a distinct way: it is possible to starve from 
hunger if game is not successfully hunted. e diﬀerence to chimpanzees who themselves 
engage in cooperative hunting is not striking when compared to this feature itself. e 
point is that with increasing importance of meat for higher energetic supply, on the one 
hand hunting styles must have become more eﬃcient and technologically dependent 
while on the other hand the frequency of sharing large packets (Kaplan, Lancaster and 
Hurtado, 2000) of the hunted game sharply increased. With reference to the more 
complex foraging methods that can inherently be assumed to constitute the eﬃciency 
gains Boyd and Silk conclude that brain growth and extended maturing periods for this 
purpose were favored by selection. As a result the emergence of a higher, cumulative 
human culture (language, religion, technologies) as distinct from the usually de"ned 
culture as the mode of social information transmission and retention is supposed (Lahr 
and Foley, 1998, Lewin and Foley, 2004, Foley and Lahr, 2003). e increasing frequency 
of sharing however poses a starting point for the theory of the non-genetic evolution 
(Kaplan, Lancaster and Hurtado, 2000) or gene-culture coevolution (Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman, 1981, Kaplan and Gurven, 2005) theories aimed at paving the ground for the 
exploration of sociality in modern humans as I will show in the following chapters. 
According to these ideas most of all it is socially learned strategic behavior framed by 
cultural pressures which is the driving force behind complex pro-social behaviors 
(Richerson et al., 2003). Several authors hypothesize that from the moment on in which 
humans reached a certain point of intelligence they established a level of complex societal 
arrangement that itself aerwards internalized pressures on individuals (Lewin and Foley, 
2004). ese selective pressures were “cultural” and thus distinct from natural selection 
probably leading to adaptations in humans such as speci"c emotions or cheater detection 
abilities (Cosmides et al., 2010) stabilizing cooperative strategies in societies. But in 
sizeable groups where the number of related individuals surpasses the number of 
unrelated ones and cooperation is face-to-face the rules for cooperation must signi"cantly 
diﬀer (as can be seen in chapter 3).
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Cultural evolution must have furthermore lead to adaptations allowing for mutuality in 
groups where kinship and thus indirect "tness gains are not the driving force behind 
prosocial behaviors. e evolution of indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005) or 
the hypothesized evolution of strong reciprocators (Gintis, 2000), are the core concepts of 
behavioral strategic evolution in the EEA with respect to sociality. e notion today is 
that especially contemporary mental abilities of humans are relicts of the EEA. Since brain 
evolution is a protracted process human societies and human social behavior are 
supposed to be adapted to technological, ecological and social conditions (Boyd and Silk, 
2009) of the upper Pleistocene (Foley and Lahr, 2003).
Hominids that lived in the Pleistocene are usually supposed to have exhibited forms of 
sociality that are much like those of contemporary nomadic hunter-gatherers. Humans 
therefore lived in small-scale societies or bands of up to 150 individuals with shared 
cultural and linguistic traits. Labor was sexually divided into hunting males and gathering 
females both exhibiting relatively high degree of work specialization. Property was 
relatively uncommon since production was minimized on the subsistence level. Sharing 
especially large packets of hunted meat in the group was daily routine. And in connection 
with labor division it may be counted as an in&uencing variable for a decrease in the 
degree of competition between males and a reduced degree in the sexual dimorphism of 
existing humans (Boyd and Silk, 2009). As a result and with respect to most forager 
Figure 2: e interdependencies between intelligence (Brains), sociality and group 
size (Social complexity), and ecology (Resources): all three variables depend on 
each other resulting in numerous feedback loops. Size and amount of resources in 
patches impinge on group size and promote a possible evolution of larger brains, 
allowing for complex societal arrangement in larger groups (Lewin and Foley, 2004: 
458).
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societies existing in present times it is hypothesized that upper Pleistocene societies were 
basically egalitarian, agitating politically on a communal basis in which hierarchies where 
existent but rarely linear (Boehm, 1999, Boehm, 1993, Knau, 1991). is phase may also 
have triggered the emergence of distinct production and consumption hierarchies as 
argued by Rubin (1999). Although this assumption complicates the classic examination of 
social structures in human societies this approach not only seems to be applicable but also 
may in fact disentangle the possible forms of contemporary hierarchies facilitating future 
research. 
Considering egalitarianism in foragers it is noteworthy at this point that it is the men who 
usually control the societies on the macro level. And although this governance style may 
be egalitarian, neither exerted dominance on the nuclear level of the family nor 
sometimes severe competitive agonistic con&icts for females induce this dominance style 
(Boehm, 1999). In fact the decrease of competition for food is not generally linked with a 
decrease in competition for perceptive females. Consequently although the emergence of 
culture, emotions and moral communities in the EEA may have triggered important 
psychological as well as physic barriers that may minimize the probability of "erce 
competitive con&icts the main cause of homicide in hunter-gatherers is competition for 
females (Knau, 1991; Boehm, 1999). Boehm (1993) argues that the social structure of 
those societies can therefore be best described as reverse dominance hierarchies, 
dominance hierarchies that may seem egalitarian but exert in fact strong dominance 
behaviors. Sets of these strategies contain a variety of behaviors from submission over 
ostracism to targeted killing of deviants.
Early forager societies can thus be placed at the more despotic side of the Vehrencamp 
continuum although tendencies for egalitarianism on the macro level of the society are 
strong.
2.3.2 Human Social Structure
e hominoid spectrum oﬀered insights into the dynamics of the roots of competition 
between individuals. is might give hints about the nature of human cooperation 
driving out competition in social dilemma situations. Humans especially in western 
societies today -in times of plenty- seem to have gained the ability to overcome some 
main causes of competition among themselves, namely the competition for food 
resources.
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Many authors suggest that the environment of evolutionary adaptedness shaped 
contemporary humans strongly and that our behavior is still suited to ecology and 
sociology of the upper Pleistocene (Barkow et al., 1992, Henrich et al., 2001, Wallner et 
al., 2008). It is obvious that humans must have speci"c abilities leading to cooperation in 
sizeable groups. Some of these abilities already have been characterized and will be 
sketched in the upcoming chapter. Due to the main assumptions according to the results 
of the gene-culture co-evolution one must assume that there is and was signi"cant 
selective pressure on humans living in societies, shaping cooperative abilities. 
One can hypothesize according to group selection theories that societies today selectively 
force humans to cooperate in a framework, where competition would lead to ineﬃcient 
outcomes in the long run (Boyd and Richerson, 2009). e invention of culture aimed at 
enforcing norms and rules thus might itself have led to pressures selecting certain 
cooperative player types. e more research about the foundations of human sociality is 
done the more obvious it gets that cooperative abilities do counteract the classic 
rationality driven assumptions towards human strategies in a lot of social dilemma 
situations. But still there is a lot competition between humans in contemporary societies 
and humans seem to have adopted evolutionary old social structures to the use of new 
ones in form of production hierarchies (Rubin, 2002). is is important with regard to 
human development throughout the last 10.000 years. It is not clear whether humans 
could signi"cantly adopt in this period of time and i will not start discussing this issue in 
the following. But with respect to the questions how dominant contemporary humans 
indeed are or may be and why present lives are so diverse, socially as well as economically, 
it is noteworthy to address at least some more lines to the switch from mobile foraging 
societies to sedentary societies in the Neolithic.
Knau (1991) suggests that the development of dominance in humans followed a u-
shaped trajectory over time with strong tendencies towards despotic dominance styles at 
the beginning and the end of the time-line. e minimum point with the highest possible 
egalitarian lifestyles in hominins is placed at the end of the Pleistocene. Whatever society 
followed aerwards, chiefdoms, kingdoms, or modern societies dominance styles 
appeared to be more despotic (Boehm, 1999). It is this „universal drive to dominance“ 
that must have been the nature of mobile hunter-gatherers in the Pleistocene as well (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, 1979). Plant and animal domestication and the rise of sizeable societies in the 
Neolithic were characterized by individual property, trading and increased intergroup 
competition that lead to inequality. Whether this is intra-group inequality like social 
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status or inter-group inequality as proposed ground for group selection theories these 
asymmetries may have strengthened despotism through displacement and elimination in 
the past. 
Today we live in multiple hierarchies (Sapolsky, 2004), not just production or 
consumption hierarchies, or male and female hierarchies. And although there are 
concepts dealing with the status or rank of individuals in modern societies (Marmot et al., 
1978), hierarchies in economics (Williamson, 1975), or social dominance in humans from 
an evolutionary perspective (Hawley, 1999). e asymmetry inherent to individual and 
coalitionary dominance behavior and its causes, always being framed by hierarchic 
settings characterizing social power in groups is a factor that has not undergone much 
attention. Humans exhibit a very high variation of agonistic and cooperative behaviors. 
Usually scientists exploring the roots for sociality in human societies regard both 
behavior sets independently from each other. But trade oﬀs must be expected. Social 
structure certainly does impinge on cooperative or competitive behavior. Steep and 
sometimes transitive hierarchies of contemporary societies are either a quite old or a very 
new and unique form of human sociality. It is thus not just disentangling cultural and 
innate predispositions for cooperative behavior but as well recognizing and explaining 
when and especially where (in what structure) competition drives out cooperation (aer 
cooperation has driven out competition from an evolutionary point of view). 
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3. e Evolution of Sociality – Cooperation of Humans
e following subchapters "rst of all introduce the core concepts of evolutionary game 
theory and biology about sociality and thus especially cooperation in individuals. Note 
that kin selection as the universal concept of cooperation on the nuclear level of the 
family is a common feature to all social animals is not referred to in the upcoming 
sections. ese sections are rather supposed to explain the distinguishing character of 
human social abilities.
Second, aer having introduced the most common experimental settings used in 
behavioral economic research, some main "ndings and assumptions about economic 
agents will be summarized. is chapter will end up classifying four types of players that 
are hypothesized to serve as an ultimate characteristic for agents having other regarding 
preferences. ese characteristics will in the following chapter 4 serve as basis for a 
critical assessment of how behavioral economists integrate their social preference 
approaches into the framework of behavioral ecology and evolutionary biology.
However this work does not target to question the main "ndings of behavioral economics. 
Rather than that especially chapter 3 most generally aims at stressing out that the 
investigation of agents cooperative abilities and a classi"cation of behavioral strategies is 
of big importance. As will be shown in the next section it is more the interpretation of the 
strategies economic agents apply which is questionable, both, from the perspective of 
evolutionary anthropology but as well from contemporary economic theories about 
agents.
3.1 Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Game theoretic research oﬀered and still oﬀers deep insights into the understanding of 
mechanisms that allow for cooperation and thus sociality. Nowak (2006) surveys the 
relevant mechanisms determining the evolution of cooperation. He proposes "ve 
mechanisms as being fundamental for the evolution of cooperation (see "g. 3). While 
especially the "rst three do in fact rule cooperation as being embedded in social 
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interactions the latter two are rather guided at the macro-level of sociality and its 
consequences on the framework for cooperation.
Kin Selection
e "rst mechanism is stated as Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964). It refers to the concept 
of kin selection and formalizes its mode of operation as follows:
(1) r > c/b
e relatedness coeﬃcient (r) must be bigger than the cost (c) - bene"t (b) ratio to allow 
for an altruistic act. e grounding idea according to the value of r is that relatives with a 
Figure 3: Five Rules for the Evolution of 
Cooperation (Nowak, 2006: 1562).
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high probability share a certain amount of alleles increasing with the degree of relatedness 
(Hamilton 1964). us on average sisters share about 50% of the alleles (r=0,5), nephews 
about 25% (r=0,25) and cousins 12,5% (r=0,125). e idea stated in the survey with 
respect to Haldane that someone risks his own live to save two brothers or eight cousins 
(Haldane, 1955) is the most prominent metaphorical characterization of this mechanism. 
But it also strikes out the strong limitations of kin selection theory as it is solely directed 
at maximizing inclusive "tness on the nuclear level of social structures providing a 
relatively high degree of relatedness. Altruism for example in form of nepotism (Silk, 
2006) in this sense is therefore a misleading term for behavior revealing sel"shness as 
major force behind it (Dawkins, 1976). 
Direct Reciprocity
e second mechanism that is referred to is reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) or direct 
reciprocity (Nowak, 2006). Direct reciprocity as a mechanism may lead to cooperation 
above the nuclear level of the family in repeated interactions where relatedness does not 
play a role. In its formalization (2) the relatedness coeﬃcient, r, is replaced by w, the 
probability of another interaction between two individuals. So the probability of 
interacting again must surpass the cost to bene"t ratio of a reciprocal act.
(2) w > c/b
In this setting cooperation takes place between a donor and a recipient. (2) provides hints 
about the general ideas connected to this mechanism. First of all, a donor faces costs in 
the one game while the recipient bene"ts. Second the average bene"ts of recipients must 
exceed the average costs of donors. And third, there cannot be an outside option (De 
Waal and Brosnan, 2006).
But by leaving aside relatedness as major explanation for inclusive "tness gains through 
cooperation the question arises why individuals should interact cooperatively with non-
relatives. As mentioned, already non-human primates do have „machiavellian“ 
intelligence (Byrne and Whiten, 1988) allowing to mirror causes and consequences of 
interactions with conspeci"cs. Cooperation in this respect may not be a best response 
when cheating is payoﬀ-dominant and sel"sh individuals form expectations. e 
emergence of direct reciprocity introduced as a mechanism therefore strongly impinged 
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on the investigation of strategies sustaining cooperation in repeated games between dyads 
of players (Nowak, 2006). Axelrod’s (1984) tit-for-tat strategy still is the most famous 
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) for repeated interactions guaranteeing zero or slightly 
positive payoﬀs for cooperators in games where they face defectors. 
To see this suppose a game played repeatedly by a cooperator using tit-for-tat strategy and 
a probable defector. e average number of rounds played is given by the term 1/(1-w). If 
both defect in the "rst round, payoﬀs will be zero. One-sided cheating in the "rst round 
yields all in all payoﬀs for the defector of b and a payoﬀ for the cooperator of –c. Two-
sided cooperation in the "rst round yields payoﬀs for both in the amount of (b-c)/(1-w). 
It is easy to see that tit-for-tat is an evolutionary stable strategy for cooperators in this 
game if and only if w > c/b holds while always defect is ESS in any case. (2) in this respect 
is a “necessary condition for the evolution of cooperation” (Nowak, 2006) of but it is far 
from being suﬃcient. 
In the end the evolution of cooperation through direct reciprocity as proposed by Trivers 
(1971) is a general rule paving the way for pro-social behaviors but is as well highly 
constrained by the applied strategies of interacting individuals.
Indirect Reciprocity
Since kin selection and direct reciprocity do need at least some proximity between the 
interaction partners, either by relatedness or spatial nearness, both approaches can 
explain cooperation in small societies but fail to do so when group size increases at least 
to a medium size. e proposed mechanism of indirect reciprocity (Trivers, 1971, 
Alexander, 1987, Nowak and Sigmund, 1998) oﬀers a way out of this dilemma. 
Implementing reputation as mechanism enforcement device, Nowak and Sigmund (1998) 
isolated evolutionary stable strategies when indirect reciprocity is the rule. Reputation is 
measured by “image scoring”, yielding to one-point increases in the score for every 
cooperative interaction and equivalent decreases for every defection. Reputation in form 
of positive or negative image scores is a measurable index for an individual’s preferences 
to cooperate (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004). By implementing this measure Nowak and 
Sigmund were not just able to overcome the problem relatedness or nearness but 
speci"cally the problem of immediacy and face-to-face mutuality of pro-social acts. 
It is far from being the norm that cooperation is valued equally from both interaction 
partners, an assumption that is congruent with the case of direct reciprocity. us in the 
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standard setting of game theory dealing with indirect reciprocity there is again always a 
donor who decides whether or not to cooperate with a recipient. But with this indirect 
mechanism this is because the need for cooperation usually depicts some asymmetry 
between the needs of donating and the needs of receiving help in spatiotemporal contexts. 
If an individual is supported in any way by a donor it is neither assured that it is able to 
give back skilled help to the same person at all nor is it assured that they both ever meet 
again to eventually have the possibility to reciprocate. 
e core of indirect reciprocity is therefore rooted in what Trivers (1971) called third 
party altruism. You are willing to cooperate if your partner cooperated before with others. 
And since you might not know her personally and do not know if she cooperated ever 
before what is of interest for you is her all in all reputation. “Direct reciprocity is like a 
barter economy based on the immediate exchange of goods, whereas indirect reciprocity 
resembles the invention of money. e money that fuels the engines of indirect 
reciprocity is reputation.” (Nowak, 2006: 1561)
Here two questions arise. First of all and this is more relevant at this point, reputation 
must be an available information. Leaving aside the manipulative skills of humans, the 
evolution of language might be an important trigger for indirect reciprocity allowing for 
reputation (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). If actions are not observable what matters is the 
probability that someone is behaving more cooperatively or if he is a cheater. Replacing w 
in (2) by q, the probability to know the reputation of an interaction partner, indirect 
reciprocity can be formalized as:
q > c/b
e probability to know the recipients reputation must surpass the cost to bene"t ratio of 
the reciprocal act (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005).
Direct and indirect reciprocity prove to lead to identical payoﬀs for both players under 
certain circumstances. So for q=w and q -> 0 evolutionary stability is reached in both 
mechanisms by the same strategies. For all other values Nowak and Sigmund (1998) 
found especially two strategies promoting cooperation when image scores are not 
necessarily positive: And as well as Or strategies. Evolutionary stability in the indirect 
reciprocity setting can result from strategies prescribing cooperation if my score is low 
and my opponent’s score is high (And-strategy) as well from strategies prescribing 
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cooperation if my score is low or my opponent’s score is high (Or-strategy) (Nowak and 
Sigmund, 1998; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2001).
Second with reference to a problem stated by Leimar and Hammerstein (2001) image 
scoring may be inappropriate when a cooperator faces a defector and punishes him to the 
good of the society. is question of cooperation supporting second stage mechanisms 
such as punishment, social preferences or coalitionary eﬀects is quite important. 
Especially with respect to sizeable societies evolutionary stable strategies leading to 
cooperation do not work without support. I will later refer to this problem in detail.
Network Reciprocity
So far the enumerated mechanisms can be characterized as “rules of the game”. All three 
mechanisms constrain the evolution of cooperation and embedded possible evolutionary 
stable strategies by appealing to players’ decisions to participate in pro-social interactions. 
But since probabilities to interact in populations are not uniformly distributed and 
cooperation probabilities are always biased towards individuals in dynamic networks, 
network reciprocity deals with mechanisms allowing reciprocity where strategies or 
motivations can be disregarded (Nowak, 2006). 
Network reciprocity highlights the dynamics of the evolution acting on populations with 
respect to spatial structures capturing diﬀerent setups of “playboards” on which for 
example pro-sociality may emerge and manifest (Lieberman et al., 2005). e setups for 
spatial games thus are diﬀerent forms of lattices. Individuals (players) are randomly 
placed on the vertices of the lattices and have an average number of nearest neighbors, k, 
to interact (or just infect) with. Ohtsuki et al. (2006) propose that cooperation may be ESS 
if equation (4) is valid.
(4) b/c > k
For each individual of the population the number of possible neighbors (or interaction 
partners) (k) must be surpassed by the bene"t-cost ratio of potential altruistic acts.
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Group Selection
Since group selection theory was and still is a quite controversial topic I will not go into 
much detail at this point. Recent analyses show that multilevel selection may exist and that 
it has played an important role in the evolution of cooperation in sizeable groups 
(Gachter and Herrmann, 2006). According to this theory selection pressures can also act 
on groups leading to intergroup-competition. is mechanism leads to cooperation being 
ESS if (5) holds.
(5) b/c > 1+(n/m), where b/c is the bene"t-cost ratio, n is the maximum group size, m is 
the number of groups
Some authors refer to this mechanism as being culturally dependent (see Gächter and 
Herrmann, 2006; Nowak, 2006). As was noted in the abovementioned explanations, many 
diﬀerent equilibria in varying spatiotemporal contexts may exist, from pure-cooperation 
equilibria to always-defect equilibria and in between numerous mixed ones. In 
consequence it is possible that diﬀerent societies level oﬀ at diﬀerent equilibria and 
temporarily coexist. In the long run it is supposed that displacement eﬀects lead to 
increasing competition and "nally an extinction of most of the competing societies. e 
grounding inter- as well as intra-group pressures are usually referred to as selective 
cultural pressures. ese are hypothesized as being rooted in the gene-culture co-
evolution. 
3.2 Cooperation in Humans
Usually contemporary research does not focus on kin selection in humans. On the one 
hand, this may be due to the fact that modern, sizeable societies cohere although the 
number of unrelated group members surpasses the number of related ones by far and on 
the other this may be due to the fact that the mechanism is no unique human feature 
working on the nuclear level of families as can be seen in the previous paragraph (Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2003). Experimental research more likely focuses on direct and indirect 
reciprocity as well as 2nd stage mechanisms that are supposed to support and stabilize 
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cooperation under these rules. Although kin selection as cooperation enforcement device 
may be of economic interest for example with regard to family business performances in 
markets (Schulze et al., 2003) I will also not refer to this mechanism in this work. 
Furthermore the mechanisms of group selection as well as network reciprocity will not be 
included into an overview of economic experiments and results. Both "elds are yet too 
unexplored and still show much heterogeneity. Presumably they will rarely provide 
grounded "ndings for a satisfying examination of pro-social behaviors in humans.
Research in the "elds of game theory and experimental economics has increasingly 
focused on two main questions since the nineteen eighties. On the one hand especially 
evolutionary game theorists want to understand the evolutionary dynamics and strategic 
variability in diﬀerent social species and especially "gure out why humans are able to 
maintain cooperation in large-scale societies (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981, Boyd and 
Richerson, 1988, Boyd et al., 2003). On the other hand experimental economists, coming 
up with evidence for agents being not as self-interested as expected by neoclassic theory, 
try to evolve the rationality driven homo oeconomicus approach (Camerer and Fehr, 
2006, Gachter and Herrmann, 2006) with the aim to sharpen the understanding of 
incentives as driving forces of both market competition and cooperation (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2005).
In applying the same methods in their investigation of analogous behavior patterns in 
humans up to today both disciplines show signi"cant similarities. With this in mind it is 
not surprising that in some cases the line between evolutionary game theory and 
experimental or behavioral economics becomes blurred and interdisciplinary research in 
form of "eld experiments as most prominently done by Henrich et al. (2003) emerges.
e most common way for doing research about social strategies is laboratory or "eld 
experiments. Although especially Elinor Ostrom (2005) proves that market observations 
can be a fruitful approach towards an examination of human cooperative behaviors, 
experiments and mathematical modeling allow more detailed insights into the mechanics 
of decision making since external in&uences can be controlled for.  Experiments are 
usually modeled in a way that it is possible to extract information that are both applicable 
to real world situations (isomorphism principle), and spatiotemporally congruent 
(induction principle). Experiments therefore not only allow to isolate for external eﬀects 
in laboratory contexts but also to explore the roots of sociality by distinguishing between 
cultural adaptations and innate cooperative traits. Models indicate that without any 1st 
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stage mechanism cooperation can never be an evolutionary stable strategy and will be 
displaced in the long run (see "g. 4).
 
But even aer regarding mechanisms like kin selection or direct and indirect reciprocity, 
any cooperative outcome is far from being evolutionary stable over time if group size 
increases. Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) run simulations of multi-player prisoners’ 
dilemmas for 2000 generations, varying group size from 2 up to 512 players. As a result in 
groups that are merely ruled by reciprocity cooperation already breaks down in groups 
containing more than 16 members. So as already indicated when introducing reputation 
as a variable that can stabilize cooperation in section 3.1, pro-social behaviors under the 
rules of reciprocity or kin-selection itself cannot solely trigger sociality in sizeable groups.
In the following sections I will therefore in a "rst step introduce key facts about 1st stage 
mechanisms (Nowak, 2006) and corresponding human behaviors as well as 2nd stage 
mechanisms like reputation (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998), direct and indirect punishment 
(Fehr and Gachter, 2000, Fehr and Gachter, 2002) or the resulting hypothesized social 
preference approaches (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005) in diﬀerent experimental settings. 
Findings and interpretations mainly lean on two review articles, one published by Gächter 
and Herrmann (2006) and the other one by Fehr and Fischbacher (2005).
3.2.1 Experimental Designs
e usual experimental designs for investigating cooperation through direct and indirect 
reciprocity are the Prisoners Dilemma (PD), Public Good Games (PG), and Ultimatum 
Games (UG). All games have been studied extensively such that the following 
restatements are only depicted in brief.
Figure 4: e "ve mechanisms constraining the evolution of cooperation (Nowak, 2006: 1560)
Natural selection will always favor defectors instead of cooperators if no mechanism supports 
the evolution of cooperation in groups of conspeci"cs.
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e typical symmetric prisoners dilemma as introduced in Camerer (2003) provides a 
framework for dyadic interactions. Both players choose to cooperate or to defect without 
observing the opponents decision. Mutual cooperation payoﬀs (c) exceed mutual 
defection payoﬀs (d). If mutuality fails, the payoﬀ from defection (f) exceeds the payoﬀ of 
cooperation (e).
In PD games it holds that f > c > d > e such that defection is always a best response in one 
shot games and mutual defection leads to pareto dominated equilibrium payoﬀs (d,d) < 
(c,c). In the one shot game individual rational behavior should therefore always rule out 
collective rationality. With respect to the direct reciprocity assumption Trivers (1971) 
states that players are willing to cooperate if the probability of playing a game again with 
the same interaction partner exceeds the cost to bene"t ratio of the altruistic act. is 
induces necessary variations in the examination of cooperation in the PD. First, this game 
also has to be played repeatedly and not only once. Second the payoﬀs (payoﬀ ratios) 
matter and should be varied by the experimenter. ird this game has to be played 
between the same as well as diﬀering interaction partners in groups with n > 2, and all 
players have to be informed about the length of the game. Fourth agents could be given 
the possibility to gain information and eventually react on observed plays. Especially 
expanding PD games in form of larger groups or reaction scenarios like punishment or 
updating beliefs allows evaluating direct reciprocity in sizeable groups.
Public goods games are another way of capturing social (dilemma) situations. Ledyard 
(1995) provides an overview of the main experimental designs and corresponding 
"ndings. PG games are the conventional procedure for the investigation of cooperation 
strategies with multiple players. e typical PG game consists of 4 players, each having an 
initial endowment (Gachter and Herrmann, 2006). A self-chosen amount of each players’ 
endowment can be allocated to the provision of a public pool. In the experimental setting 
all contributions are added and multiplied by a factor strictly larger than one and 
thereaer equally retransferred to the players. Under certain circumstances PG games can 
thus be seen as classic PD games especially in the one shot setting (this argument is 
analogous to the case where indirect and direct reciprocity lead to the same ESS). 
According to the research design for PG games Ledyard (1995) summarizes major choices 
for the framework of experiments. As in the PD case this list contains variation in the 
number of players, payoﬀ or endowment variation, communication possibilities between 
the diﬀerent players and variations in the number of played rounds.  
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e last games that are referred to are ultimatum games (UG). Typical UG (Güth et al., 
1982) or dictator games are dyadic games with randomized interaction partners. As 
already introduced in the previous chapter in the UG setting a donor and a recipient 
interact. e donor is supposed to share his endowment with a recipient who can only 
accept or reject the oﬀered sum. In case of rejection both players receive nothing. 
Economic theory suggests that rational recipients will accept any positive oﬀer such that 
donors choose to oﬀer a minimum acceptable amount of their endowment (Camerer, 
2003). Since UG are played sequentially the recipient always has the possibility to punish 
a donor by rejection. Ultimatum games and public goods games are the most common 
experiments for the investigation of indirect reciprocity.
3.2.2 Selected Experimental Results
e "ndings that will be presented in the following are preselected in a way such that only 
more recent studies are considered and not the uncountable number of experiments that 
paved the way for them. e most important "nding of experimental economics and 
behavioral game theory is that many people are by no means sel"sh rationalists. Even in 
one-shot games that thwart the possibility of reasoning strategically in the “I scratch your 
back if you will scratch mine”-way as formalized by Trivers (1971), people do choose to 
cooperate although economic theory predicts the same agents to be rationality driven 
defectors or conditional cooperators seeking for future bene"ts (Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2003). 
In one-shot PD games around 40% of the players cooperate, although they are instructed 
about the mode of playing and although learning is possible (Cooper et al., 1996). 
Comparable results can be found in both PG and UG games. Players in one-shot PG 
games on average contribute about 50% of their endowments (Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2003), while in UG games players oﬀer on average between 42% and 48% (Henrich et al., 
2003, Henrich et al., 2005) and reject oﬀers that undercut 25% of the donors endowment 
(Camerer and Fehr, 2006). Keeping in mind that strategic play is ruled out these numbers 
are surprising. And although authors run repeated PD games in form of stranger-partner 
settings (repeated one-shot interaction) and players as a result have the possibility to 
learn, cooperation rates still remain above 20% (Cooper et al., 1996). From the one-shot 
interactions especially two types of players have been characterized, strong reciprocators 
(Rabin, 1993, Gintis, 2000) and self-regarding players.
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In iterated games players do behave diﬀerent. is is most obviously because strategies 
come into play and far less likely because of learning (Brenner and Vriend, 2006). In 
nearly all iterated games that are controlled for external in&uences like communication 
whether it is a PD or a PG repeated game, cooperation breaks down aer some periods 
(see "g. 5). e only exception may be UG games where the possibility of rejection 
includes strategic punishment, as I will refer to later. So although there exist strategies that 
could favor cooperation in the long-run, see for example “Tit-for-Tat” (Axelrod and 
Hamilton, 1981), these are just not played in reality.
 
In the abovementioned repeated PG experiment by Fehr and Gächter (2000) (n=4, 10 
periods) the authors apply a stranger and a partner scenario comparable to Cooper et al. 
(1996). When reaching the last periods of the game the repeated one-shot game between 
strangers and the iterated PG where players stay together in one group both converge 
towards zero contribution. e reason for failing reciprocity in this setting is supposed to 
be rooted in simple free-rider problems. Already a small fraction of free-riders who most 
probably do not contribute just less than others but nothing instead leads to signi"cantly 
decreased average contributions. Cooperators who have expectations about the other 
Figure 5: A public good game (4 players, 10 rounds, equal initial 
endowment) with partner and stranger conditions (Gächter and 
Herrmann, 2006: 284). Although agents contribute more in the 
partner setting, cooperation in both conditions is by no means 
stable.
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players’ choices update their beliefs and decrease their contributions over the course of 
the game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003) (see "g. 6).
But still contribution rates in the partner setting are always strictly above the ones of the 
stranger setting, a feature that is also valid for repeated stranger-partner scenarios 
(Cooper et al., 1996). is may induce that “the possibility of behaving strategically 
strongly increases cooperation” (Gächter and Herrmann, 2006: 282). And behaving 
strategically in these cases should not be mixed up with rational play approaches of classic 
game theory. Backwards induction leads to the only Nash equilibrium outcome, namely 
always defect as in the corresponding one-shot games. But this outcome is only reached in 
the long run. So what these experimental outcomes also induce is that there must be 
diﬀerent types of cooperation, namely conditional or unconditional cooperation.
Conditional cooperation can be a response by especially two types of players, self-
regarding players and strong reciprocators (Camerer and Fehr, 2006, Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003). While self- regarding players choose to defect whenever defection is 
individually rational, strong reciprocators play pro-social strategies as a response to 
cooperative outcomes in the previous rounds (Clark and Seon, 2001). Unconditional 
cooperative behavior can be observed in one-shot or iterated one-shot PD and PG games 
Figure 6: Relationship between contributions and expected 
contributions of reference agents in a social dilemma situation 
(PG) (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003: 787)
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(stranger-partner games). It does not rely on other players’ strategies or outcomes. 
Whether this behavior can be characterized as strong reciprocating (Gintis, 2000) or not 
is still part of contemporary discussions. In a study by Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 
(2001) 50% of the players were conditional cooperators and around 30% were sel"sh free-
riders. 
Summarizing at this point, no experiment has yet revealed that direct reciprocity without 
any supporting mechanism (communication etc.) can lead to stable cooperation rates in 
groups containing free-riders. Supposed that there are always diﬀerent types of players 
(Henrich et al., 2003), self-regarding play always suppresses cooperation (see Figure 3) 
(Fehr and Gächter, 2002).Reciprocity, whether direct or indirect, has been studied in very 
diﬀerent ways more recently (Boyd et al., 2003). e most important feature in those 
experiments is that players at least have to gain information about other players’ 
decisions, whether they are strangers or known partners. Two experimental designs are 
striking in this respect, ones’ implementing punishment possibilities and others’ 
implementing a player’s reputation. ese two mechanisms can be seen as 2nd stage 
mechanisms that can support cooperation in situations where reciprocity would 
otherwise fail. Coordination games where players may communicate are excluded in the 
following since this would go far beyond the scope of this chapter.
“Any mechanism that generates such a belief [a belief that most players will 
cooperate] has to provide cooperation incentives for the sel"sh individuals”. (Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2003: 787)
In the above mentioned repeated partner-stranger PG game as designed by Fehr and 
Gächter (2000; 2002) players were furthermore given the possibility to punish defectors 
(free-riders) at the end of each round. In any case punishment was formal and thus 
caused a payoﬀ reduction for the defector and the punisher. e authors ran diﬀerent 
sessions in each condition such that in half of the rounds played, direct punishment was 
allowed for (see "gure 7). What is surprising in this setting is that although punishment is 
costly for the punisher it in fact occurs and may reach 50% of the initial endowment (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 2006, Fehr and Gachter, 2002) in both conditions. And since perfect 
stranger scenarios hinder net bene"t seeking through strategic punishment this is even 
more surprising. If players were self-interested rationalists there should not be any 
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diﬀerence in both sessions and free-riding should always drive out cooperation (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2005). 
Leaning on Fehr and Gächter (2002) punishment is in consequence rarely used as a 
strategic instrument for rationality driven players. A second observation that the 
punishment-endowment ratio is correlated to the magnitude of free-riding (the diﬀerence 
between a defectors and the average contribution) might even underline that strategic 
play is not the driving force here. Direct reciprocity can thus establish high cooperation 
rates if punishment is possible (Fehr and Gächter, 2002) and group size remains small 
(Boyd et al., 2003). e same of course holds for indirect reciprocity as can be seen in the 
perfect stranger scenario. As for conditional cooperation one can apply the same logic in 
the characterization of punishment. Some players tend to punish defectors in one-shot 
interactions, some in repeated interactions and some never punish (Camerer and Fehr, 
2006).
Concerning strategic play in repeated games, in applying the mechanism of punishment, 
individuals can thus be seen as conditional punishers that have future bene"ts in mind 
(just as it was with conditional cooperators) or on the other hand as strong reciprocators 
Figure 7: Results of a PG with a perfect stranger setting (2 groups, 4 
persons each group, 2 rounds to play). Irrespective if a group starts 
with punishment possibilities, cooperation breaks down when 
punishment is not allowed (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Gächter and 
Herrmann, 2005: 292).
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(altruistic punishers) that care about other players’ income respectively fairness (Fehr and 
Gachter, 2002, Boyd et al., 2003). But this does not imply that players who do not punish 
are always self-regarding. Andreoni and Miller (2002) show that there are players that just 
never want to decrease other players’ payoﬀs. ose players play cooperatively but never 
punish altruistically. 
Punishment especially indirect punishment as the possibility to penalize even players that 
failed to directly punish defectors (as introduced in the following) can lead to cooperation 
in larger groups (up to 500 members) under the rules of direct and indirect reciprocity 
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).
Simple ultimatum games where the possibility to penalize defectors is inherent to the 
game provide observations for both punishment motives, and even more. 
First, as stated above rejection rates in one-shot as well as in repeated UG are quite high if 
the oﬀered sum is below 25% of the proposers endowment. Furthermore in extended 
three players UG with an additional player who can only punish a defector but is 
otherwise economically independent of the game outcome, 55% choose to punish low 
oﬀer proposers. And around 70% of the recipients expect such a behavior (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004). is unveils that players do care about fairness. Second, rejection in 
repeated UG leads to increases in next rounds’ oﬀers at around 7% irrespective of the 
question if the game is played in stranger or partner scenarios (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2003). Depending on how well recipients anticipate the fact that punishment induces 
proposers to behave more cooperatively this observation can support both views. But 
third, and this is more important at this point, the reaction of the proposer reveals that he 
cares about the recipients reaction. And this is not because of conditional cooperative 
behavior. Even informal sanctions that do not impinge on anyone’s payoﬀ aﬀect proposers 
decisions in later rounds (Masclet et al., 2003). 
What might matter at this point is reputation. As already introduced in the previous 
section reputation is the other 2nd stage mechanism that can enforce cooperation. In 
“Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring”, Nowak and Sigmund (1998) provide 
a framework that allows for the evolution of cooperation in sizeable groups where 
everyone holds a social status in form of a reputation. 
Reputation is herein gained via image scoring which means that players are awarded 
points for every cooperative act and malus points for each defection (see also: Seinen and 
Schram, 2006). Other players are given information about the scores of reference agents 
and aerwards choose their play. UG experiments designed to explore indirect reciprocity 
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scenarios reveal two main facts about agents’ behavior according to reputation. In perfect 
stranger experiments players with a good reputation are more likely to be treated 
cooperatively (Milinski et al., 2002). Cooperation rates in games went up to 90% revealing 
that at least some of the more sel"sh players that can be supposed to be part of the game 
strategically acquire a good reputation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). In addition, 
experiments that allowed comparing indirect reciprocity games with and without public 
reputation seeking possibility (of both recipients and donors) revealed that with public 
recipient reputation, only 37% of donors choose to cooperate when no reputation could 
be gained, whereas 74% did so in the other scenario. When recipients’ reputation was 
private both numbers decreased to 32% respectively 69% (Engelmann and Fischbacher, 
2009). is unveils that altruistic rewarding in indirect reciprocity games is only half the 
story. e authors conclude that about 80% of all players are prone to strategic incentives 
and that non-reciprocal (sel"sh) players "nish games with signi"cantly higher payoﬀs 
than altruistic players do. Whether indirect reciprocity via reputation as the only 
enforcement device can therefore lead to evolutionary stable large-scale cooperation is 
still questionable. 
3.3 Social Preferences
As can be seen in the above cited studies agents do behave a lot less sel"shly than 
economic theory assumes. Many people de"nitively care about other players’ payoﬀs and 
seem to experience utility gains when equality is established. is is even observable in 
Dictator Games, where strategic play in any way is ruled out (Forsythe et al., 1994). But 
experiments also revealed that there are many diﬀerent types of players and that by far not 
everyone is behaving altruistically. 
Most players thus exhibit social preferences suggesting that the self-interest assumption of 
economic agents is only one side of the medal. e following description is leaned on 
reviews provided by Fehr and Schmidt (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006) and Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2005). 
One of the most striking preference that has been strongly promoted by a variety of 
researchers is the preference for strong reciprocity (Rabin, 1993, Gintis, 2000, Bowles and 
Gintis, 2004, Fehr and Henrich, 2003, Bowles and Gintis, 2003). Strong reciprocators are 
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driven by conditionality but do not act strategically and do not consider future payoﬀs in 
plays’ decisions. Players that exhibit such preferences are supposed to care about fairness. 
ey usually cooperate in one-shot games but only do so in repeated interactions when 
they face cooperative play. Fairness also induces them to punish defectors. Strong 
reciprocators thus vary in altruistic rewarding and altruistic punishment even if this 
behavior ends up with taking a loss (Gintis, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005). 
A second social preference is inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Players who are 
inequity averse cooperate with those that have yielded below-average payoﬀs so far but 
punish others that have performed better than others. ey furthermore dislike facing 
unequal income shares (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). So just as strong reciprocators they 
do care about other players outcomes and value them. Inequity may be a form of 
reputation in this context although a fairly bad one. To see this note that inequity averse 
players do qualitatively diﬀer from strong reciprocators in their conditionality. Since they 
do care about average payoﬀs, decreasing other individuals’ outcome is a fundamental 
motivation. If this includes penalizing strong reciprocators or free-riders makes no 
diﬀerence to them. So although strong reciprocators’ and inequity averse players decisions 
are hard to distinguish in some cases latter ones are by far helping to stabilize cooperative 
outcomes (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005; Camerer and Fehr, 2006).
A third main "nding is that some players have social preferences in the form of 
unconditional altruism. e most important feature is that those individuals do not 
ground their play on reciprocity. Unconditional altruists thus never care about other 
players’ payoﬀs negatively. ey only value possible outcome increases and thus another 
players’ economic resources positively (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005, Fehr and Schmidt, 
2006). Consequently they do behave altruistically in the way that they never want to 
decrease payoﬀs. But this does not imply that they either reward altruistically or ever 
punish (Andreoni and Miller, 2002).
e last social preference that shall be referred to at this point corresponds to 
unconditional altruism in some way. Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) suggest that some 
individuals do care about a reference agents’ payoﬀ negatively. Players that behave in such 
a way are believed to have spiteful (envious) preferences. Spiteful persons want to reduce 
other players’ payoﬀs unconditionally no matter what has been played before or of what 
sort of (strong reciprocators etc.) they are. 
e most important and most probable characteristic can be regarded as the strong 
reciprocity assumption. With regard to pro-social behaviors it can be assumed that most 
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cooperative players exhibit at least this social preference. But as abovementioned 
experimental results indicate, a large share of players cannot be characterized by social 
preferences as depicted so far, such that there is still much unexplained heterogeneity. 
Many players are regarded to be sel"sh actors that conditionally cooperate to the best of 
themselves (Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009). 
Players exhibiting pro-social preferences may force others to cooperate, changing the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma into an assurance game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). But on the 
other side, as experiments show, this need not be the common rule. Depending on the 
design of the game and possible coordinative mechanisms (punishment, reputation) 
sel"sh players may not just dominate players with pro-social preferences but also drive 
them out in a few periods.
All relevant experiments indicate that it is pro-social preferences that drive cooperation in 
groups coping with social dilemma situations. Indirect Reciprocity can lead to stable 
cooperation rates in sizeable groups provided that cooperative players are given 
mechanisms to suppress sel"sh reference agents and are willing to do so. Experiments 
furthermore show that altruistic rewarding and altruistic punishment must be 
evolutionary independent mechanisms that cannot have common roots. Punishment can 
thus not be seen as mechanism for the evolution of cooperation (Nowak, 2006). And 
although reputation has long been recognized as such a mechanism (Nowak and 
Sigmund, 1998) recent experiments also question this assumption (Engelmann and 
Fischbacher, 2009).
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4. Politics in Hierarchies
“Nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on 
astronomy, because sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical 
Almanack. Being rational creatures, they go to sea with it ready 
calculated; and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with 
their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong, as 
well as on many of the far more diﬃcult questions of wise and foolish.”
(Mill, J.S., 1861: 31)
We saw in the previous chapter that recent approaches in the investigation of sociality in 
humans oﬀer new insights into a number of social dilemma situations that have been 
targeted by numerous studies throughout the last decades. It was underlined that the most 
prominent assumption towards human cooperative abilities is that they heterogeneously 
vary between economic agents (Schmidt, 2010). 
e Social Preference approach as introduced in chapter 3 suggests that individuals may 
be ultimately characterized according to their decisions in social dilemma situations. 
Laboratory experiments as described in the previous chapter unveiled that many players 
behave conditionally cooperative. At least to some extent players can furthermore be seen 
as having other-regarding preferences (for a discussion of whether to use the term self-
regarding instead, see Gintis, 2009). In how far these preferences are based on 
individually perceived fairness grounds (Gintis, 2000) or even a magnitude of inequity 
aversion that goes far beyond subjective comparison is still part of contemporary research.
Although most "ndings and resulting assumptions about human behavior in the con&ict 
of classic rationality and contemporary approaches dealing with pro-sociality or bounded 
rationality are striking, important questions remain unanswered. By investigating 
sociality in humans, throughout the last decade many behavioral traits and strategies 
supporting cooperation in groups of diﬀerent size could have been extracted. Especially 
behaviors shown by strong reciprocators, inequality averse agents and unconditional 
altruists could (have) play(ed) an important role both in the development of sizeable 
groups as well as in the maintenance of reciprocity ruling cooperation. 
What is remarkable at this point is that as mentioned in section 3.3.2 by no means all 
players chose to play strategies leading to stable cooperative outcomes in any way. With 
reference to those players authors just suggest that they must be envious or spiteful and 
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stop specifying further types aerwards. Up to today there has not been paid much 
attention towards the possible types of players using anti-social strategies out of an 
envious or spiteful motivation to cite only the popular examples. e only remarkable 
exception can be found in Herrmann, oeni and Gächter (2008) where the authors 
explore anti-social punishment strategies exerted by a signi"cant share of non-
cooperative players. So ultimately, the characterization of sociality in humans can be seen 
as one-sided focusing only on player-types whose strategies support cooperative 
outcomes in experimental settings. Consequently Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) state that 
“although previous research clearly indicates that many people exhibit social preferences 
it is important to keep in mind that not everybody exhibits social preferences. In fact, 
most studies indicate that there is also a substantial number of people who behave in a 
purely sel"sh manner”.
e following subchapters bring together both, the hypothesis of evolutionary biology 
about sociality as introduced in section 2 and the "ndings of experimental economic 
research about the social preferences of economic agents. For the purpose of simplicity a 
founded critical investigation of this synthesis will be divided into two parts. In 
subchapter 4.1 it will be shown that the interpretation of the relevant experimental results 
of most economic experiments of the last decade need not necessarily be suﬃcient to 
deduce universal theories about human cooperative action. Subchapter 4.2 however goes 
one step further and questions the validity of the applied experimental settings in the 
search for the patterns of cooperative behavior. Considering the same hypothesis from 
evolutionary anthropology that build the theoretic framework for the above mentioned 
economic "ndings and interpretations both parts will provide a critical assessment within 
the scope of the reasoning of social preference theory. So it is not the purpose of the 
following subchapters to question the validity of the outcomes of selected experimental 
research but much more than that to reveal relevant misconceptions and 
misinterpretations that hinder targeted future research.
4.1 e Situational Character of Preferences
e social preference approach is a (logic) tautology: players behave pro-socially and exert 
social preferences or they just do not. e problems resulting from this assumption are 
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twofold. First of all referring to another work by the same authors in 2005 (Falk et al., 
2005), envious and/or spiteful preferences are stated as being social preferences. Without 
loss of generality one can suppose that at least some envious players may be other-
regarding just because they are sel"sh (and vice versa) such that social preferences do not 
merely refer to pro-social behavior at all. Fehr’s and Fischbacher’s tautological assumption 
thus must be neglected. 
Second and this is more striking at this point it is not plausible that there are 
heterogeneous cooperative agents on the one side and homogeneous sociopaths (Gintis, 
2009) on the other. In this regard more recent studies oﬀer insights into the variability of 
agents play. Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009) show that even mainstream experiments 
might oﬀer much data that just has not been gathered before. By far more players are 
prone to strategic behavior and conditionality in cooperation or defection than was 
supposed. And this observation results from a type of game (DG) that is applied as 
extreme version of ultimatum games in most contemporary experiments, focusing on 
behavior in social dilemma situations that are ruled by indirect reciprocity. One can 
assume that the results thus are due to re"ned measurement tools more than variations in 
the experimental setting. So the quite diﬀerent characters of players could have similarly 
been observed in previous research. Just controlling for a „contamination“ of incentives 
for strategic reputation building (Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009: 403) oﬀers a 
magnitude of diﬀerentiation in the characterization of players that surpasses the essence 
of most former studies and questions the categorization of pro-sociality (and resulting 
social preferences) at least to some extent. 
Another point that is relevant here is the “situational character of preferences” (Gintis,
2009: 75). Besides the fact that even in the usual experimental settings of behavioral 
economics many player types might just have been overlooked according to the variability 
of their play, many authors question the somewhat path-dependent way of analyzing 
sociality in laboratory experiments (Binmore, 2007, Gintis, 2009, Camerer, 2003). Of 
course it is always questionable in how far results of laboratory experiments can be seen 
as a mirror of real life interactions. Critiques in this regard mostly deal with how 
incentives for players are chosen, the representativity of samples, or just the chosen games 
(and limits to the derivation of rules of behavior thereof). e most general critique in 
this regard can be found in Hammerstein (2003). He hypothesizes that repeated games are 
not suited well enough for exploring reciprocity or indirect reciprocity in humans, since 
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timescales are too long and task-control mechanisms (e.g. outside options) are usually 
factored out. I will not refer to most of those points in the following. 
e main problem to be noted here instead is whether the subjects are able to adapt their 
behavior to the situation of the experiment in a way that one can derive real life 
behavioral strategies from it. Or the other way around, supposed that individuals are able 
to adapt to the laboratory environment: how does the mode and the aim of experimenting 
in laboratories aﬀect individuals  ´actions and the occurrence of behaviors being triggered 
through social preferences? And do experimenters really control for a “contamination” of 
resulting behavior in the laboratory setting?
e supposition that players do in fact adapt behavioral strategies in contexts of 
analogous studies is substantiated with respect to the comparable experimental results 
mentioned above. 
Considering the "rst question Gintis (2009) who is dealing with the same matter 
concludes that it is not behavior but the social preferences itself that are spatiotemporal 
dependent and thus incongruent:
“Rather, we suggest that generally a social situation, which we call a frame, is 
imbued with a set of customary social norms that individuals oen desire to follow 
simply because these norms are socially appropriate in the given frame. To the 
extent that this occurs, preferences themselves, and not just their behavioral 
implications, are situationally speci"c. e desire to conform to the moral and 
conventional standards that people associate with particular social frames thus 
represents a meta-preference that regulates revealed preferences in speci"c social 
situations.” (Gintis, 2009: 75)
He underlines this assumption in referring to a study by Dana, Cain and Dawes (2006) 
that oﬀers insights into the supposed dynamics. In this study, participants played a DG 
with an outside option. Dictators had to choose whether or not to share an endowment of 
10$ with a reference agent. Aer their choice they were given the possibility to take an 
outside option guaranteeing them on the one side a payoﬀ of 9$ and on the other, that the 
reference agent would not be informed that a game had been played at all. As mentioned 
in paragraph 3.2 the usual outcome in a DG is that most donors oﬀer positive amounts to 
receivers and that the oﬀered sum is strictly below UG transfers, at around 30% of the 
initial endowment (Camerer, 2003). However in this study about 46% of the donors who 
decided to transfer a positive amount at "rst chose the outside option on the cost of 1$ 
thereaer. Oﬀering a way out of the dilemma resulted in a share of less than 25% of the 
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donors transferring a positive sum to the receivers. is experiment unveils two 
important "ndings. First, just as in Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009) palyers’ behaviors 
are far more conditional than most experiments throughout the last decade indicated. 
Important studies might thus have been “overestimating the level of concern for others’ 
welfare that people have” (Dana Cain and Dawes, 2006) in their extrapolation of the role 
of social preferences. But as distinct from conditionality in the framework of social 
preferences altruism in here is proved to be far more dependent on the structure of the 
interactions showing that preferences must be situation-speci"c. 
Second, most of the experiments aimed at exploring the roots of sociality in humans, 
seem to be lacking possibilities to capture the interdependencies of meta-preferences 
(Gintis, 2009) in diﬀerent situational contexts. Players that have been regarded as strong 
reciprocators or inequity averse agents in other experiments now reveal that they in fact 
are other-regarding in their normative, cooperative behavior but self-regarding if they just 
have the possibility to “escape”
the framework of interaction. One should therefore reconsider the assumption that 
displayed behaviors are a proof for a possible ultimate characterization of heterogeneous 
cooperative agents.
Regarding the question how structure of experiments and the purpose of investigations 
do change the resulting behaviors of agents, even without thinking of competition 
between “economic men” (Camerer and Fehr, 2006), one can conclude that the answer 
must be: severely. So supposed that social preferences must be regarded as a 
predisposition (Gintis et al., 2005) in agents it is more vague than ever in what 
circumstances individuals reveal their type and what frame induces meta-preferences to 
allow for speci"c adaptations. 
In the line of this thought the second question can be highlighted. e aim of most 
experiments like the ones mentioned in section 3.3.2 is to reveal the roots of sociality. 
Mathematical modeling and most laboratory (as well as "eld) experiments aim at 
disentangling cooperative traits that are a result of the gene-culture co-evolution to 
understand “the biological basis for diﬀerences in preferences and rationality 
bounds” (Camerer and Fehr, 2006). But do researchers really control for biases in a way 
that the biological basis can be understood? Nearly all experiments investigate direct or 
indirect reciprocity between unrelated humans in experiments where interactions 
between at most 4 people take place. Since Güth (1982) and the following rise of 
ultimatum games dyadic and triadic experiments are the rule.
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Kin selection as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in groups of highly related 
individuals is never referred to since this focus on the nuclear unit of the family is 
straightforward and is (correctly) not expected to help in the investigation of large-scale 
cooperation. But the family is a well-de"ned structure and a frame in which certain types 
of other regarding preferences are triggered. And family as the part of a social structure is 
by de"nition given in kin selection as an evolutionary stable cooperation rule (see 3.1). 
is implicit guidance is missing in the other proposed 1st stage mechanisms leaving the 
problem what structure it is and where it can be located, in which direct or indirect 
reciprocity reveal other regarding social preferences. So far there have not been many 
laboratory experiments that targeted this issue. Instead the focus is more and more 
shiing towards deepening examinations of experimental settings that nearly always oﬀer 
analogous frames and thus result in path dependent results.
Structure in most UG and all DG experiments must be seen as being highly despotic 
according to Vehrencamp scale. Power in social dilemma situations is skewed towards a 
small number of powerful agents. If it is the initial endowment or punishment 
possibilities that provide agents with power is not important at this point. And as distinct 
from most recent investigations of eﬃciency contracts where hierarchies are implicitly 
part of the game the abovementioned UG and DG experiments not just fail to explore this 
issue but fail to realize that they have chosen a structure that implements (linear) 
hierarchies.
Nevertheless the notion of hierarchies as social structures seems to have found its way 
into contemporary research (Gintis, 2009; Gächter and Herrmann, 2006). “Egalitarian 
preferences” (Gintis 2009: 70) such as strong reciprocity now are seen as a result of the 
conditions of group living in the EEA that triggered the emergence of an egalitarian ethos 
(Gächter and Herrmann, 2006). As mentioned in Section 2.3 it is supposed that the gene-
culture coevolution (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981) gave rise to the emergence and 
maintenance of pro-social behaviors as well as the establishment of reverse dominance 
hierarchies in hunter-gatherer societies (Boyd et al., 2003).
It is clear that all individuals do compete for scarce resources with the aim to maximize 
direct or indirect "tness. In all abovementioned primate species high rates of competition 
between unrelated individuals can be found. Especially food sharing is quite unusual and 
competition for receptive females is the rule (Boyd and Silk, 2009). Hierarchies are seen as 
the organizing principle of all group members’ relationships, whether in non-human or 
human primate groups, resolving and harmonizing competition (De Waal, 1987a). 
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Agonism in hierarchies thus replaces a signi"cant share of "erce con&icts. In consequence 
resource access is usually markedly skewed towards the dominant individuals (Sapolsky, 
2005). Competition for ranks within the frame of hierarchies in primate societies already 
is highly political, including alliance formation as well as manipulation (De Waal, 1996).
With respect to structures of human societies, besides the meat sharing hypotheses, 
especially coalitionary agitation and support are widely supposed to have triggered the 
emergence of higher egalitarian structures in foraging societies (Strier, 2007). But those 
structures are quite distinct from the ones that can be observed in primate societies. 
Although egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies must be seen as being despotic, dominance 
in here is exerted by peers (moral communities) and aimed at single individuals who 
impinge against norms (Boehm, 1999). Although this ability to mediate is also supposed 
to be an important characteristic of alpha males in primate societies, the grounding social 
structure diﬀers signi"cantly (de Waal, 1996). So in general hierarchies in non-human 
primate societies show a lot more steepness and linearity in their structure than 
hierarchies of forager societies do (Boehm, 1999). And the concentration of social power 
on single individuals like alpha males ore females as a consequence must be seen as a 
characteristic more suited to non-human primate societies in evolutionary contexts. 
On this basis one must argue if the applied experimental designs of most UG and DG 
games do not resemble hierarchies of primate societies rather than those of forager 
societies of the upper Pleistocene. It seems odd that researchers derive a human social 
preference like strong reciprocity from behaviors adapted to a structure that humans were 
especially not used to in the EEA. 
So even supposed that the hypothesis that food sharing scenarios as can still be found 
within the Hadza today are a reason for human cooperative abilities (Hawkes et al., 2001, 
Kaplan and Gurven, 2005) researchers nevertheless study the situational character of 
social preferences (Dana et al., 2006) and obviously bias their results due to a lack of 
control for structure variables that "t to the proposed evolutionary background. If social 
preferences are situation speci"c the least thing to control for is the interdependencies 
between social structure (namely hierarchies) and displayed behaviors before deriving 
further hypotheses from it.
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4.2 Sociality and the Social Structure
“Why is it that many people seem to have strong social preferences 
when they interact in small groups, while they seem to be purely self-
interested when there is competition?” (Schmidt, 2010: 11)
Considering the development of sociality in human societies it is striking that although 
on the one hand contemporary western democracies replaced highly despotic hierarchies 
like kingdoms or chiefdoms, institutional frames of contemporary societies whether it is 
the company, the church, or nearly all bureaucracies of organizations are quite 
hierarchical and show in some cases even a pronounced steepness and linearity (e.g. 
military). Rubin (2002) hypothesizes that this is due to the fact that social structures and 
especially hierarchies changed signi"cantly with the advent of sedentism. In his view 
both, the hierarchies of most human and non-human primates as well as the hierarchies 
of hunter-gatherer societies of the EEA must be seen as consumption hierarchies. He 
states that the use of this type of social structure is mainly zero sum since all these 
societies are basically subsistence economies with a “"xed amount of resources, including 
sometimes access to females” (Rubin, 2000: 262) to be allocated. While it is most 
commonly agreed that the basic bene"t of consumption hierarchies is the reduced 
individual cost of the struggle for scarce resources the main distinction in both can be 
found in the increased social ability of humans to form alliances aimed at weakening the 
very same (de Waal, 1996). us consumption hierarchies are regarded to be inherent to 
the sociality of all group living primates and especially humans, resulting from intragroup 
competition between "tness maximizing individuals (Rubin, 2002).
With the rise of agriculture and animal domestication at the end of the pleistocene 
(Diamond, 2002) hierarchies in settled societies changed signi"cantly. Speci"cation, labor 
division, and especially the ownership of property made trade possible and led to the 
necessity of markets and hierarchies where former ones were suggested to fail.
So the hierarchies of contemporary societies like the ones in "rms or most other 
organizations are supposed to be “production hierarchies”. In the line of Coase (1937) 
(there is “a cost of using the price mechanism”) and later on Williamson (1983; 1985) 
these hierarchies aim at coordinating economic transactions where massive transaction 
costs can be expected. Production hierarchies or semi-authoritarian relationships (Coase, 
1937) via contracting are thus economically a best response to situations where 
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opportunism and incomplete contracts would otherwise lead to market failures. Within 
the organization ownership of assets (Grossman and Hart, 1986) on the one hand and as 
well wage contracts on the other create a power relationship between two contracting 
economic agents, in the frame of this chapter especially in the employer-employee 
relationship (Foss et al., 2000). Leaning on Waldron (1998) it is important at this point to 
make a distinction according to status rankings and formalized positions in organizations. 
Although both may go hand in hand sometimes in the framework of this work the focus 
lies on the former structures, calling them production hierarchies in the following.
In line with Boehm’s (1999) view on egalitarian societies as reverse dominance hierarchies 
one can conclude that there has obviously never been a time in which humans did not live 
in dominance hierarchies and that today humans seem to “have adapted the dominance 
hierarchy to new uses related to division of labor” (Rubin, 2002: 101). So if dominance 
behaviors and associated ranks do impinge on increased resource acquisition possibilities, 
even for today’s social structures one can assume that contemporary agents are still prone 
to acting in this frame. And ranks in "rms’ hierarchies do signi"cantly impact on the 
received wages of employees (Gibbons and Waldman, 2006). Since the usual 
organizational framework oﬀers employees “promotion, salary revision, or 
bonus” (Prendergast, 1999: 9) as mayor incentives in vertical hierarchies (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2001), competition for higher ranks must be expected and has been 
substantiated for such tournament scenarios (Prendergast, 1999, Baker et al., 1994). And 
obviously the more contestants compete for higher ranks in production hierarchies, the 
higher the expected wage increase must be. Rajan and Zangales (2001) state that 
competition between agents varies with the steepness of hierarchies in the institutional 
setting, showing that it increases in the transition from horizontal hierarchies with less 
pronounced power relationships to vertical hierarchies. 
With reference to the diﬀerences between consumption and production hierarchies this is 
of some importance. De Waal (1996) hypothesizes that egalitarian dominance hierarchies 
developed from more despotic ones as consequence of humans’ dependency on 
cooperation and the increasing possibilities of leaving societies. For production 
hierarchies at least in some respect these assumptions can also be applied. Within the "rm 
competition between agents for higher resource provision is skewed towards those groups 
that show more steepness with more competing agents. Since the principal-agent problem 
as an authoritarian power-relationship is per se also aimed at surviving in competitive 
markets, the demand for more egalitarian structures in most "rms can be regarded as 
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being quite low. Since hierarchies whether steeper or not are the rule in today’s 
organizations one can suggest that even if labor markets guarantee agents to choose their 
employee freely there is usually a low incentive to do so on grounds of the structure itself. 
So despotic production hierarchies may have developed from more egalitarian 
consumption hierarchies throughout the last 10.000 years out of comparable reasons. As a 
result for contemporary organizations it can be supposed that there is comparably marked 
competition crowding out reciprocity. is crowding out then would rather be due to 
reasons of structure than to reasons of contracts.
If all humans are really innately prepared to engage in dominance-and-submission 
behaviors (Boehm, 1999) this will most obviously mirror in agents behavior within 
production hierarchies. Principals rank their agents (Prendergast, 1999). And resourceful 
agents in consequence must be expected to act correspondingly and “expand their 
opportunities” (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 8). is sheds light upon the paradox that 
while peer eﬀects are expected to increase productivity via team production eﬀects as well 
as via solving the free-rider problem at least to some extend (Carpenter et al., 2009), 
social comparisons on the other hand are expected to decrease cooperation where direct 
reciprocity is the rule (Gächter et al., 2008). Furthermore an evolutionary approach 
explaining the preferences and related behaviors in social structures may also give hints 
about the gender diﬀerences of behavior in competitive situations (Price, 2008, Andreoni 
and Vesterlund, 2001). e hypothesis that collective organization increases with the 
steepness of the authority relation (Williamson, 1985) is therefore only half the story. 
Leaving the framework of consumption hierarchies aside and entering contemporary 
structures, competition for resources via ranks in organizations may drive out 
cooperation signi"cantly. With reference to Schmidt (2009) as well as Camerer and Fehr 
(2006) asking when and where economic men drive out cooperation one must ask the 
question if agents should not be expected to exhibit an extreme form of social preferences 
aimed at increasing the rank in a production hierarchy. Although especially Camerer and 
Fehr (2006) do oﬀer a solution in terms of strategic incentives, this approach again fails to 
address the question where (according to the situational character of preferences) agents 
change their play. If social preferences are spatiotemporally dependent they will certainly 
diﬀer in production and consumption hierarchies although in both cases individually 
"tness maximizing behavior is the sole impetus. Recognizing agents as having other 
regarding preferences for power relationships would thus help sharpening the social 
preference approach and overcome its tautological assumptions. And especially inequity 
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aversion, which is stated to be a relict from the EEA seems to be an odd social preference 
in this respect. It is highly probable that this other regarding preference is dependent on 
the framework in which reciprocity is expected to lead to cooperative outcomes. 
While the endowment eﬀect is regarded as the drive of motivation for agents to defend 
their resources (Gintis, 2009) inequity aversion could consequently be seen as the 
motivation of lower ranked agents to compete for a higher status strategically lowered by 
one-sided gis (Jones, 1984)(see "g. 10). High reputation in competitive situations could 
in this framework also lower the probability of received reciprocal altruism from 
coalitions of competitors instead of increasing it as it is suggested for consumption 
hierarchies (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998).
Concluding at this point implementing a rank gradient as social preference could change 
interpretation of observed behaviors as well as expand the social preference approach to 
competitive situations. If humans have a tendency “to resist being low ranked members of 
dominance hierarchies” (Rubin, 2002: 100) while at the same time they have a strong 
tendency to establish exactly the structures that trigger inequality this step should be 
made and grounding dynamics should be explored.
“One core question is to understand the workings of competition and the interplay 
of competition and cooperation in markets, organizations, and politics. Other core 
questions pertain to understanding the conditions for successful collective actions, 
the prevailing structure of contracts and property rights, and, above all, the 
workings of economic incentives, because the workings of incentives constitute the 
essence of economics. We claim that a satisfactory understanding of these 
questions is impeded by the self-interest hypothesis.” (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005: 
152)
Distinguishing between diﬀerent types of hierarchies as framing social structure for 
cooperation may pave the way for the understanding of the interplay between 
competition and cooperation. In this line of thought the traditional self-interest 
hypothesis should not be neglected or regarded as hindering a further understanding of 
agents’ preferences but rather be included into the social preference approach as postulated 
throughout the last decade. Gintis (2009), hypothesizing about meta-preferences, oﬀers a 
way out of this dilemma opening the increasingly path dependent research "eld for wider 
approaches mirroring sociality in humans more precisely. 
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4.3 Concluding remarks
e starting point of a critical assessment of some main results of the research about 
economic agents  ` social preferences was to argue whether "ndings and corresponding 
interpretations are reasonable or not. It was argued that the transfer of economic 
reasoning into the framework of evolutionary anthropology obviously brings along a 
number of problems. Both, the way of applying biologic hypothesis in evaluating 
laboratory "ndings as well as the way of designing proper experiments now appear to be 
focal problems of contemporary research.
From the viewpoint of behavioral economy there is obviously the necessity to examine 
how suggested player types behave when there is competition. From above mentioned 
reasons it is more than just doubtful that there are heterogeneous pro-social agents facing 
self-regarding sociopaths. It is more reasonable that players change their behavior with 
the transition from consumption to production hierarchies and the increase of 
interpersonal competition for resources in form of wages. e grounding framework for 
cooperation that is direct reciprocity rather than indirect reciprocity in most cases needs 
not to be neglected in here. One can assume that in both structures direct reciprocity can 
lead to the emergence of stable cooperation rates but that the underlying personal 
strategies just change and are spatio-temporarily varying. 
In hunter-gatherer societies cooperative hunting and resulting food sharing cannot only 
be explained by other regarding fairness or inequity averse preferences. Taking the 
probability of having success in large game hunting for the Hadza as an example 
(Marlowe, 2004), one can assume that both hunting as well as meat sharing is aimed at 
maximizing direct "tness where the probability of marked undersupply is high. 
Reciprocity here is thus just a best response to the threat of shortage. In the occupational 
structures of contemporary organizations on the other hand, direct reciprocity is held 
accountable for the maintenance of teamwork. Will and ability to cooperate are inherently 
expected from the employees to exploit the eﬃciency gains provided by team production 
and are in consequence served by agents if they want to remain in the "rm instead of 
being "red.
But competition, although this is especially not mentioned in the explanations for 
inequity aversion is also inherent to both structures. Gintis (2009) is correct assigning the 
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emergence of other regarding preferences to the exerted pressures on societies in their 
development in the Pleistocene. But he seriously disregards competition for resources 
between agents when not taking the main cause for homicide in hunter-gatherer societies 
into account, namely a competition for females. ere is "erce competition in hunter-
gatherer societies today, resulting in comparably high homicide rates (Boyd and Silk, 
2009). On the other hand, with respect to the tournament game literature of the eighties 
or more recent behavioral approaches concerning competition in multi-player ultimatum 
games it is obvious that there is much competition in todays’ "rms. Moreover if the 
reasons for pro-sociality are supposed to be rooted in the development of societies 
throughout the Pleistocene and resulting adaptations in the behavior and social abilities 
of individuals, this must also hold for competitive abilities or strategies. Social structures 
in contemporary organizations are all despotic in terms of behavioral ecology varying 
from those where employees are ranked in steep, linear, and transitive dominance 
hierarchies (especially in physical-capital intensive industries) to more horizontal ones. 
Since agents usually do not even own shares of the organization these structures in some 
respect may even aim at increased competition between agents that care about their social 
status and corresponding future payoﬀs (Rajan and Zingales, 2001).
What still remains unexplored is the question about the correct structure for the 
experimental investigation of the roots of sociality as well as agents’ adaptive abilities 
regarding diﬀerent social structures. e structures used in most contemporary 
experiments might be better suited for an investigation of recent hierarchical structures 
and resulting behavior strategies. Due to the variability of hierarchies that can be found 
within organizations of western societies it would be important to "nd out how these 
structures impact on agents’ observed behaviors, and disentangle past results concerning 
humans and the proposed social preferences.
Research in the "eld of epidemiology and health economics on the one hand as well as 
stress research in primate societies on the other reveal that there are signi"cant 
correlations between rank and health of agents in western societies respectively primate 
groups. Stress research may be an important approach for the investigation of the social 
structure contemporary humans are adapted to with respect to their roots of sociality. As 
will be shown in the upcoming chapters, the notion of the correct structure and resulting 
rank dynamics is not only a question of research for the foundations sociality but as well a 
question of stress.
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Besides the fact that stress and resulting diseases are suggested to be one mayor epidemic 
of the 21st century and understanding the roots for it may help battling its causes, the 
extend to which agents do perceive diﬀerent structures of games, certain game situations, 
and other agents behavioral strategies as stressful might be a quanti"able factor in a 
reliable examination of human sociality and agents social preferences.
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Excursus: e Socio Economic Status (SES) - Health Gradient and its 
Limits
Traditionally the SES must be regarded as “a measure that typically incorporates 
economic status, measured by income; social status, measured by education; and work 
status, measured by occupation” (Adler et al., 1994: 15).  Profound large-scale 
examinations of the interdependencies of economic measurements such as income, 
education and wealth (the SES-health gradient) already started in the nineteen sixties of 
the 20th century (Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999). Up to today many correlations between 
the factors of the SES have been revealed especially for western societies. In particular 
income and income inequality are suggested to be one mayor health indicator on the 
individual level. erefore the SES-health gradient is nowadays supposed to be “a multi-
level phenomenon. Relationships of variables [such as education, income, and wealth] 
with health operate through individuals  ` preferences and their capacities to purchase 
health inputs, process information, and participate in economic life.”
e focus of more recent approaches has thus increasingly shied towards disentangling 
the interdependencies between work status and health. Since research as most 
prominently done within the Whitehall Studies revealed that income and income 
inequality in inter-temporal contexts on aggregate societies, should no longer be treated 
as estimates for the working of the health gradient, the SES as measurement tool for 
future policy recommendations about health increases today seems to be a quite blunt 
instrument (Marmot et al., 1978, Marmot et al., 1991, Cutler et al., 2008). Although 
Operario, Adler and Williams (2004), Singh‐Manoux, Marmot and Wilkinson (2005) and 
others propose a more subjective based measurement of the social status instead of using 
e.g. absolute income inequality to overcome the above mentioned shortages it will remain 
questionable to which degree the proposed associations are causal for the correlations 
(Steptoe and Marmot, 2002, Singh-Manoux et al., 2005) unless the puzzle of the 
mechanisms underlying the links between rank and health gradient has not been solved. 
According to Wilkinson (2000) this means that instead of re"ning the statistic measures 
of the SES, one should better ask, whether it is not (internal) factors like psychosocial 
welfare or the social environment that impinge on health and cause diseases.
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Debating on the same issue, Deaton (2003) strikes out the importance of the social 
environment. Referring to "ndings of evolutionary biology and anthropology he states 
that health could be particularly dependent on the social structure itself whenever 
humans are not adapted to it. According to the hypothesis about human sociality during 
the Pleistocene a signi"cant decrease of health would thus be expected in those 
hierarchies in which severe inequalities between agents emerge. As can be seen with 
respect to abovementioned remarks about Rubin`s (2002) distinction of diﬀerent 
hierarchies Deaton (2003) implicitly talks about the diﬀerences in humans` reception of 
(Steptoe et al., 2003)consumption and production hierarchies. Wealth or education in 
consequence would just aﬀect the rank of an individual in the "rst instance, while the 
status in contemporary production hierarchies or the competition for it could cause 
increases in the liability for diseases in employees: “Individuals of greater wealth and 
education enjoy better health not because of some process aﬀecting the individual in 
isolation but rather because of the individual`s position in a social hierarchy” (Cutler, 
Lleras‐Muney and Vogl, 2008: 22).
Regarding humans  `diﬀerences in the reception of their ranks in diﬀerent hierarchies the 
path run by Steptoe and Marmot (2002) seems to be fruitful. eir research links stress 
research "ndings about agents` aﬀected homeostasis resulting in cardiovascular diseases 
to SES diﬀerences, especially the occupational status. Supposed that it is the rank or the 
competition for it that aﬀects individuals homeostasis, examining social structures and 
grounding competitiveness in experimental games via measuring the extend of stress 
hormone releases of aﬀected agents would oﬀer deep insights into the mechanics of the 
interdependencies between rank and SES-health gradient. Some research has been done 
within this frame already (Hasegawa et al., 2008), showing that stress research might be a 
pathbreaking approach not just in the investigation of occupationally perceived stress, but 
as well in the investigation of rank-regarding social preferences.
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Occupational Ethology
As stated in the previous chapters it is of supreme importance to "gure out the mechanics 
of the transition from cooperation to competition in groups of interacting agents. e 
possible vertices for an attempt to investigate these mechanics as sketched in chapter 4 
and the following excursus proved to be quite diverse. A paper by Wallner, Machatschke 
and Fieder (2008) takes up some of these accounts proposing a new research "eld called 
“Occupational Ethology” (OE). Originally OE is suggested to contribute to the growing 
body of work-place stress research in doing fundamental experimental examinations 
about how interactions in diﬀerent work place scenarios aﬀect each agent’s homeostasis. 
e measurement of aﬀectedness will be conducted via collecting saliva samples of the 
participants of experiments and the analysis of stress mediators such as cortisol. is gives 
hints about the degree of a stress reaction resulting from speci"c interaction situations or 
just game structures. As an interdisciplinary orientated research "eld that integrates 
"ndings of evolutionary anthropology, social sciences and stress research OE thus 
especially emphasizes questions of the correct structure underpinning proposed "ndings 
instead of just measuring increased cortisol releases as consequence of mere competition 
(Hasegawa et al., 2008). So according to both its predictive power as well as its value in 
providing information about the roots of sociality with reference to social structures it is 
easily more than traditional stress research. 
e following subchapters aim at introducing the reader into the "elds of applied stress 
research in humans. ereaer it will be shown that the assumptions and grounding 
research questions of OE are in the line with above mentioned reasoning of chapters 2 
and 4. is research "eld can thus be treated as one possible solution to the shortcomings 
of both, structure as well as related "ndings of behavioral economic experiments and 
health economics dealing with the rank gradient and its health aﬀecting consequences.
5.1 Research as proposed by OE
Research as proposed by OE is striking most notably because of its point of departure. As 
distinct from the usual experimental settings focusing on the maintenance of cooperation 
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occupational ethology starts with the assumption that direct or indirect reciprocity 
between two reference agents fails. is is exactly the situation, where economic men just 
tried to drive out cooperation, whether successful or not. As stated above it is neither 
scienti"cally reasonable nor inevitably expedient to set out from the point where pro-
social cooperators are supposed to establish cooperation in groups that may consist of a 
signi"cant share of sociopaths. Selection theory assumes that individuals try to increase 
the probability of having more reproductively successful oﬀspring than its conspeci"cs. 
is implies that there is competition for resources between every individual. Altruism or 
reciprocity must be seen as a strategic adaptation to a competitive situation where 
cooperation in the long run exceeds the expected bene"t to cost ratio of defection. en 
cooperation is a best response to failing competition (in the long run) and not the other 
way around. OE is thus approximating the core mechanisms of the transition from 
cooperation to competition from the opposite side compared to usual experimental 
settings.
Applying the same reasoning of evolutionary biology and anthropology as can be found 
in chapter 2 OE assumes the following propositions to hold for. 
It suggests that „all humans faced the same basic system of social ecology and sexual 
selection“  (Wrangham, 2001: 143) during the Pleistocene. e increase in the need of 
high energetic food supply as consequence of higher demands due to physiology changes 
(most of all increasing brain size) forced humans to to adapt quickly to a rapidly changing 
environment and develop into mobile hunter-gatherer societies. ese societies were 
especially characterized by increasing complexity in developing technologies, a sexual 
division of labor as well as collective hunting and sharing of large game (Kaplan, 
Lancaster and Hurtado, 2000). e gene-culture coevolution (Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman, 1981) as proposed, led in consequence to the development of complex societal 
arrangements in growing societies by humans adapting social behavior strategies. It is 
highly probable that it was this framework of subsistence economy supported by complex 
cultural norms and rules that led to the development of reciprocity (Richerson et al., 
2003).
Pronounced dominance behaviors in social hierarchies mitigated with the development 
of the „Man the Social Animal“ (Lewin and Foley, 2004) throughout the EEA reaching a 
minimum about 10.000 years ago. Still both, hunter-gatherers of the EEA as well as 
contemporary equivalents had or have structures or consumption hierarchies that must 
nonetheless be described as being despotic reverse dominance hierarchies (Knau, 1991; 
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Boehm, 1999; Boyd and Silk 2007). Contemporary production hierarchies that are a 
decisive characteristic of large scale societies are suggested to be an invention of modern 
humans, adopting and advancing consumption hierarchies to the new use of productive 
eﬃciency (Rubin, 2002). 
Occupational ethology hypothesizes that humans gave rise to a form of competitive social 
structure that they are not adapted to. Steep and sometimes even transitive hierarchies of 
contemporary workplaces must be characterized as being highly competitive, forcing 
agents to contest for scarce resources, particularly wages. Since these are correlated to 
ranks in formal hierarchies there is certainly also some transition to hierarchy approaches 
as provided by Coase (1937) or Williamson (1985). us, if humans are assumed to 
exhibit behaviors resulting from the EEA (a notion that is true for nearly all cited 
research) this further presumption is especially true with respect to situations where 
reduced resource access will lead to declined darwinian "tness. In respect thereof 
competition is assumed to be an inherent characteristic of humans having diﬀerent 
impacts on males and females that must be seen as acting according to an innate drive for 
dominance just like the one that can be observed in other primates. Observing that the 
maintenance of the status quo in dominance hierarchies of most primate societies 
exhibiting comparably egalitarian dominance styles induces alphas to show a mixture of 
dominant and reconciliative behaviors instead of suppressing subordinates steadily OE 
predicts that subordinates expect dominant higher ranking agents to show analogous 
behaviors. With regard to the suggested inequity aversion of agents this is of speci"c 
interest (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Blurton Jones (1984) hypothesized that large packets of 
food show diminishing returns to the utility of the proprietor leading to what he called a 
„tolerated the“. In this reasoning an owner of a divisible good shares it with a 
subordinate in order to consolidate his rank. If agents in experiments adapt their behavior 
to a hierarchical game structure elevating them to a rank above the one of the reference 
agent, inequity aversion as modeled above could be interpreted completely contrary if the 
social structure changes.
As a highly political animal humans just as the individuals of tolerant or egalitarian 
primate societies, form coalitions as means of gaining dominance or as means of facing 
dominant behavior of reference agents. Coalitionary agitation and support is the major 
force applied and expected by agents facing dominance in competitive interactions 
(Sapolsky, 2005). OE acknowledges these "ndings and proposes that coalitionary support 
is expected by subordinates in hierarchic structures, whenever direct reciprocity between 
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those and a higher ranking reference agents fails. We know today that agents expect third 
parties to punish cheaters. What is still unsolved is the grounding motivation for 
sometimes even severe punishment decisions (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) by payoﬀ 
independent third parties and whether the will for coalitionary agitation is adoptable to 
the motivation to punish in competitive situations.
Finally in the context of failing indirect reciprocity OE suggests that reputation must be 
de"ned in a way that it "ts to a competitive interaction. Usually reputation is aimed at 
informing members of a society about past decisions in social dilemma situations. 
Cooperation leads to increasing reputation, while defection decreases the all in all 
reputation of agents. Reference agents adjust their game decisions accordingly and 
cooperate, when they expect the reference agent to cooperate, otherwise they will choose 
to defect.
In a competitive scenario as it is sketched in the propositions of OE, reputation must work 
diﬀerently. Where independent agents observe repeated defections these are expected to 
work as a functional variable lowering the reputation of the aﬀected cooperating 
subordinate. Within the competition in transitive hierarchies this can be seen as a passive 
strategy to collectively step up the ladder and leave the aﬀected agent behind. Aer all this 
last assumption seems to be questionable. If negative reputation is really a trigger for 
strategic passivity it will be hard to isolate this feature of human competitive behavior in a 
way that a de"nition of reputation as proposed by OE is comprehensible. 
All these suggested research topics are supposed to vary in both the observed strategic 
behaviors as well as the stress reaction of the aﬀected cooperator. OE in consequence will 
explore the dynamics of competition and social reorganization within contemporary 
hierarchies.
5.1.1 Eﬀects of Stressors on Homeostasis
Stress can be regarded as an evolutionary adaptation optimizing the abilities to deal with a 
response to environmental and psychosocial situations (McEwen and Seeman, 1999). e 
stress reaction in an evolutionary context is an adaptive process mobilizing physiologic 
resources (energy) in order to overcome or challenge life-threatening situations ("ght-or-
&ight response). In contemporary societies one must distinguish between two diﬀerent 
types of stressors, namely physical and psychosocial stressors. Former ones are external 
challenges to homeostasis (e.g. predators). Latter ones must be suggested to result as 
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consequence of individuals anticipation that a threat might occur (e.g. con&ict 
management in social interactions, lack of control) (Sapolsky, 2005).
e physiologic reaction resulting from both kinds of stressors appears to be basically the 
same, leading to homeostatic imbalance. Two physiological mediators, namely cortisol 
and catecholamines (adrenalin and noradrenalin) regulate many body processes as well as 
controlling the reaction to a stressor. Cortisol is the decisive part of OE stress research. Its 
release as response to a stress reaction mediated by the HPA-axis is described in the 
following.
1) Neocortical Perception.
2) An extraction of hypothalamic neuropeptides such as corticotropin-releasing 
hormones (CRH), which triggers the adenohyphophysis to release ACTH 
(adrenocorticotropic-hormone). ACTH is transported by the blood to the adrenal 
cortex.
3) Elevated release of the glucorticoid cortisol by the adrenal cortex.
4) e symptoms of an increased cortisol extraction are shown.
In order to maintain the homeostasis, primary functions of cortisol are to increase b  lood 
sugar, suppress the immune system and maintain the metabolism of fat and proteins 
(Klinke et al., 2005). 
Figure 8: Maintenance of the homeostasis via increased releases of 
stress mediators in response to short and long term stress (Klinke and 
Silbernagl, 2005: 463).
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Cortisol extraction underlies a circadian rhythm. On average cortisol levels peak in the 
morning and reaches its minimum concentration between midnight and four am. 
In connection with an abnormal ACTH level as a reaction of stress, the cortisol level 
increases.  is results in imbalanced homeostasis (see "gure 8).
Considering a short term stress reaction in connection with increased levels of 
catecholamines (autonomous nervous system) the body prepares for a "ght-or-&ight 
response: the heart tone increases, relevant muscles are better supplied with energy via 
blood (glucogenolysis and dilatation of blood vessels), and bronchialdilatation leads to 
increased oxygen content in the blood. In an evolutionary context this reaction aims at 
increasing the probability of surviving dilemma situations. But this essential characteristic 
turns out to be quite harmful if the frequency of stress reactions increases over a certain 
period. In this case a long term stress reaction leads to prolonged and relatively stable 
elevated cortisol releases. In consequence the heart rate is elevated, high-density 
lipoprotein cholesterol is decreased whereas low-density lipoprotein cholesterol is 
increased, individuals suﬀer from hypertension, artherosclerotic plaque formation in 
injured blood vessels and a chronic suppression of the immune system (Sapolsky, 2005). 
Repeated exposure to stress mediators is thus associated with high mortality rates being 
grounded in diseases such as cardiovascular disease, morbus cushing, insulin-resistant 
diabetes or aﬀective disorders (Wallner, Machatschke and Fieder, 2008).
5.2 OE as a Solution to the Social Preference Dilemma
e predictions of OE give "rst hints about the possible contributions to "nding a 
solution for above mentioned dilemmas. OE proposes especially two types of scenarios 
for experimental settings in which failing direct or indirect reciprocity are suggested to 
lead to stress in aﬀected cooperators.
„When direct reciprocity fails between colleagues in the same working unit the 
predicted stress reaction in the aﬀected cooperator is a function of, (a), the 
frequency of defections, (b), the social rank distance between the defector and the 
cooperator, and, (c), the social support from colleagues provided for the aﬀected 
cooperator. us one can predict that the larger the social rank distance between 
the cooperator (e.g. low SES) and the defector (e.g. high SES) is, the less social 
support the former will receive, and the higher his stress response will be. In case 
of failing indirect reciprocity, the stress reaction of the aﬀected cooperator is a 
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function of, (a) the frequency of defections and, (b), the degree of negative 
reputation the cooperator will receive.“ (Wallner, Machatschke and Fieder, 2008: 
282)
First of all suggested research questions will lead to a deeper understanding of the 
grounding mechanisms of occupationally perceived stress in agents with a high 
probability. It may thus hold the key in bringing forward proofs that ranks impinge on 
health directly as claimed by Cutler, Lleras-Muney and Vogl (2008). Picking up on at least 
some of the explored interdependencies in non-human primates between elevated 
cortisol releases of individuals holding speci"c ranks and dynamic societal settings of 
reorganization or stability periods (Sapolsky, 2005), OE assumes that these research 
questions can be adoptable to humans. With respect to the quite analogous physiology of 
humans and its nearer relatives this assumption can be expected to hold.
But above this OE can furthermore help in "nding a solution to the question when 
economic agents crowd out cooperation.
Bringing into mind the core arguments about the lacks of investigation of social 
preferences approaches this is even more striking. e research about other regarding 
preferences seems to be stuck whenever competition between agents occurs. Up to today 
there have not been many promising studies trying to close this gap between pro-social 
and mere rational maximizing behaviors in agents. If OE chooses adoptable research 
designs it will certainly help disentangling the proposed characteristics of other regarding 
and sel"sh players. Gathering informations about how stressed agents are in speci"c 
social dilemma situations might give insights about innate preferences for certain social 
structures and motivations to play cooperatively or respond accurately to received non-
cooperative choices to play. Furthermore, knowing about the physiologic eﬀects of rank 
distances may clarify why peer eﬀects work that diﬀerent from social comparisons. As 
mentioned before OE could also explain why agents do have a social preference working 
against unequal outcomes. It was examined before that it is quite reasonable that 
especially this preference can be highly situation speci"c and might have its roots in 
competitive situations and not in cooperative ones. 
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6. Conclusions
Questions on the roots of sociality in humans are by no means the domain of biologists 
anymore. As could be seen during this work economics and evolutionary biology and 
anthropology are increasingly converging in a number of topics. roughout the last 
decades both disciplines increasingly re"ned the framework of sociality for a deeper 
understanding cooperation in social animals. It was shown in the beginning of this work 
that the features of primate sociality have various origins. Natural and sexual selection as 
well as ecologic pressures shape group structure and group organization in multiple ways. 
Besides mating systems the social structure itself is the important in&uence variable on 
the interplay between con&ict and cooperation. 
e hierarchy is suggested to be an epiphenomenon of competition replacing a signi"cant 
share of physical aggression for resources by establishing a concept of dominance and 
submission. Dominance hierarchies in consequence are one of the most important 
characteristics of the referred primate species. In primates these dominance hierarchies 
may take diﬀerent forms leading to changing patterns of how concentrated social power 
on certain individuals is. is question of the dominance style lead to a characterization 
of most referred primate social systems as being relatively despotic. As was further 
described humans have evolved abilities to cooperate that go far beyond any of those 
found in other social animals. With the emergence of culture and especially the increased 
necessity of sharing food, humans have adapted social strategies allowing for evolutionary 
stable cooperation ruled by reciprocity in groups where the number of unrelated 
individuals surpasses the number of related ones by far. But humans are also suggested to 
be quite despotic as well, especially with regard to the last 10.000 years and the emergence 
of property. 
Surprisingly especially behavioral economists seem to underestimate this competitive 
feature of human sociality. It was summarized in chapter 3 which focusses contemporary 
research about real life cooperative behaviors in humans chooses. e investigation of 
human social strategies and characteristics of agents has revealed several important 
behaviors that might have supported cooperation and resulting outcomes in groups of 
heterogenous agents. Especially the tendency to punish defectors or gain a reputation in 
repeated games is noteworthy at this point. Social diversity and the emergence of diﬀerent 
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types of players such as strong reciprocators or inequity averse players are also suggested 
to have signi"cantly impacted on the emergence and evolutionary stability of cooperation. 
ere are especially two main problems with the experiments and proposed results of 
behavioral economics and behavioral game theory of the last decade.
First, researchers stated that there are either diﬀerent types of cooperators or just one type 
of cheater. e idea stated in this work with reference to Gintis (2009) is that social 
preferences are situation speci"c adjusting with every new situation. Taking evolutionary 
biology into account the idea that diversity leads to heterogenous agents without any 
exception allowing for homogenous sel"sh sociopaths seems to be convincing. 
Second, although in particular the notion of strong reciprocity is convincing there are 
diﬃculties with the experimental designs revealing this other regarding preference. 
Leaning on the description of primate social systems experimental settings in which UG 
and DG scenarios are applied must be seen as being despotic in their structure in a way 
that cannot be found in human societies of the EEA but rather in macaque societies. 
Deriving social preferences from those structures and explaining them with the 
adaptedness of humans towards social structures of the upper pleistocene seems to be odd 
in this sense. is is even more striking when looking more precisely at the hypothesized 
social preference against unequal outcomes. 
e idea of inequity aversion is that agents value unequal outcomes diﬀerently. So 
although the inequality is the same for both agents, the one having more of a resource 
suﬀers less utility losses than his counterpart. Supposed that agents can cope with the 
situation when facing a steep hierarchic structure and adopt their play the interpretations 
of all social preferences but strong reciprocity must be rethought.
One suggested research "eld that may be able to cope with the stated problems of 
contemporary research is occupational ethology (Wallner et al., 2008). 
OE`s main target is to explore the reasons for stress related diseases in modern 
workplaces via measuring cortisol levels of players in diﬀerent social dilemma situations. 
e idea behind its research question is that humans experience stress whenever they are 
not adapted to a certain social structure. So consequently this way of exploring agents 
when playing games in diﬀerent game situations and structures may provide deep insights 
into the situational character of preferences. And furthermore it could allow exploring the 
motivation and variability behind certain social preferences such as inequity aversion. 
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If one could show that agents consciously act in and adopt their strategies to dominance 
hierarchies the mechanics of the transition from competition to cooperation and the 
resulting other regarding preferences could be profoundly assessed and re"ned.
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Glossary
adaptation  “A trait that enhances "tness and that arose historically as a result of 
natural selection for its current role.” (West et al., 2011: 232)
altruism  “A behavior that is costly to the actor and bene"cial to the recipient or 
recipients . Costs and bene"ts are de"ned on the basis of lifetime direct "tness 
consequences of a behavior.” (West et al., 2011: 232)
cercopithecine  “One of the two major divisions of Old World monkeys, these have 
cheek pouches.“ (Strier, 2007: 373)
cooperation  “A behavior that provides a bene"t to another individual (recipient), and 
the evolution of which has been dependent on its bene"cial eﬀect for the 
recipient.” (West et al., 2011: 232)
direct !tness  “e component of "tness gained through the impact of an 
individual’s behavior on the production of its own oﬀspring; the component of 
personal "tness due to one’s own behavior.” (West et al., 2011: 232)
dominance  “e ability of one individual to intimidate or defeat another individual in 
a pairwise (dyadic) encounter. In some cases, dominance is assessed from the 
outcome of aggressive encounters; in other cases, dominance is assessed from the 
outcome of competitive encounters.” (Boyd and Silk, 2009: A6)
dominance hierarchy  “A ranking of individuals in a group that re&ects their relative 
dominance.” (Boyd and Silk, 2009: A6)
!ssion-fusion  “A &uid arrangement  whereby social groups break up and rejoin 
according to the prevailing environmental conditions.” (Barett et al., 2002: 385)
!tness  “e number of copies of a particular gene contributed to future 
generations.” (Barett et al., 2002: 385)
grooming  “e process of picking through hair to remove dirt, dead skin, 
ectoparasites, and other material. Grooming is a common form of aﬃliative 
behavior among primates.” (Boyd and Silk, 2009: A8)
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hominids  “All species that belong to the family Hominidae, which includes 
Australopithecus and Homo.” (Barett et al., 2002: 386)
hominoidae   A superfamily, “which includes humans, all the living apes, and 
numerous extinct apelike and humanlike species from the Miocene, Pliocene, and 
Pleistocene epochs.” (Boyd and Silk, 2009: A8)
inclusive !tness  “e eﬀect of  one individual’s actions on everybody’s production 
of oﬀspring, weighted by the relatedness; the sum of direct and indirect 
"tness.” (West et al., 2011: 232)
indirect !tness  “e component of "tness gained from aiding related 
individuals.” (West et al., 2011: 232)
intersexual selection  “A form of sexual selection that is driven by female choice of 
suitable mating partners.” (Barett et al., 2002: 386)
intrasexual selection  “A form of sexual selection driven by competition within the 
same sex for suitable mating partners. In most cases, intrasexual selection acts more 
strongly on males than females.“ (Barett et al., 2002: 386)
mating system  “e form of courtship, mating, and parenting behavior that 
characterizes a particular species or population.” (Boyd and Silk, 2009:(Boyd and 
Silk, 2009) (S. A10)
matrilines  “Females related to one another through maternal descent“ (Strier, 2007: 
377)
mutual bene!t  “A behavior that is bene"cial to both the actor and the 
recipient.” (West et al., 2011: 232)
natural selection  “e process that produces adaptation. Natural selection is based 
on three postulates: (1) the availability of resources is limited; (2) organisms vary in 
the ability to survive and reproduce; and (3) traits that in&uence survival and 
reproduction are transmitted from parents to oﬀspring. When these three 
postulates hold, natural selection produces adaptation.” (Boyd and Silk, 2009: A11)
neocortex   “Part of the cerebral cortex; generally thought to be most closely 
associated with problem solving and behavioral &exibility.” (Boyd and Silk, 2009: 
A11)
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patrilines  “Males related to one another through paternal descent“ (Strier, 2007: 
378)
philopatry  “e tendency in some animals to remain in their natal (birth) groups 
throughout their lives. In many Old World monkey species, females are 
philopatric.” (Boyd and Silk, 2009: A12)
polyandry  “A mating system in which a single female forms a stable pair-bond with 
two  [or more] diﬀerent males at the same time. Polyandry is generally rare among 
mammals, but it is thought to occur in some species of marmosets and 
tamarins.” (Boyd and Silk, 2009: A12)
polygyny  “A mating system in which a single male mates with many females. 
Polygyny is the most common mating system among primate species.” (Boyd and 
Silk, 2009: A12)
prosimians  Lemurs, galagos, lorises, and tarsiers.
recipient  “An individual who is aﬀected by the behavior of the focal actor.” (West et al., 
2011: 232)
relatedness  “A measure of the genetic similarity of two individuals, relative to the 
average; the least-squares linear regression of the recipient’s genetic breeding value 
for a trait on the breeding value of the actor.” (West et al., 2011: 232)
sexual dimorphism  “Diﬀerences between sexually mature males and females in 
body size or morphology.” (Boyd and Silk, 2009: A14)
sexual selection  “Evolution by sexual selection occurs if genetically diﬀerent 
individuals diﬀer in their reproductive success because of diﬀerences in their ability 
(1) to compete with others of their own sex for mates or (2) to attract members of 
the other sex.” (Alcock, 2006: 365)
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Summary
is master thesis aims at providing a more complete understanding of what are the 
underlying mechanisms of cooperation and competition and the behavioral transition 
from one to another. Since behavioral economic research about the social preferences of 
economic agents chooses the framework of evolutionary biology it will start by depicting 
the roots of sociality from an ecologic as well as an evolutionary perspective. is will 
allow mirroring the multiplicity of in&uence factors that shaped and still frame social 
organization and social structure in human societies. As will be shown it is furthermore 
of major importance to highlight the evolution of hierarchies in primates and the 
resulting adaptations in social and especially political behavior. e following part will 
deepen the understanding of the mentioned evolved behaviors by reviewing the main 
"ndings of behavioral and experimental economic studies of the last twenty years. 
Aerwards it will be critically evaluated whether these "ndings are reasonable or not. As a 
synthesis of the previous descriptions some structural errors and possible misconceptions 
of social preference theory are stressed out. Following this, a short excursus into the 
reasons for the socioeconomic status (SES) research being stuck in "nding an answer to 
the question why ranks do impinge on health is provided. is is done with regard to 
Occupational Ethology (Wallner et al., 2008) as a presented research project aiming at an 
investigation of the roots of sociality and consequences of lacking adaptive abilities 
towards modern workplace structures of agents. Due to its interdisciplinary background, 
Occupational Ethology is somewhat a convergence point for the diﬀerent branches 
dealing with the mechanisms of failing cooperation and may thus overcome the limits 
social preference theory faces.
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Zusammenfassung
Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, die grundlegenden Mechanismen kooperativem sowie 
kompetitivem Verhaltens zu erläutern. Da gerade in den letzten Jahren vermehrt versucht 
wurde, Ergebnisse verhaltensökonomischer Studien auch anhand evolutionsbiologischer 
Hypothesen über das Verhalten von Menschen zu erklären, werden in einem ersten 
Schritt die Grundannahmen der evolutionären Biologie und Anthropologie über das 
Entstehen und die Entwicklung kooperativer Verhaltensmuster aufgeführt.
Da die Organisationsstruktur der Gruppe substanziellen Ein&uss auf die adaptierten 
sozialen und kompetitiven Verhaltensstrategien von Individuen nimmt, wird des weiteren 
ein besonderer Fokus auf die Evolution hierarchischer Strukturen, sowohl beim 
Menschen, als auch bei nicht menschlichen Primaten, gelegt. 
Die folgende Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Ergebnisse verhaltensökonomischer 
Studien über das Entstehen und die Charakteristika sozialer Präferenzen komplettiert den 
Stand der Forschung und erlaubt eine kritische Evaluation der heutigen Sichtweise 
kooperativen Verhaltens. Hierdurch ist es möglich einige strukturelle Fehler der 
experimentellen Forschung, sowie mögliche Fehlinterpretationen kooperativer 
Verhaltensstrategien aufzudecken. Es zeigt sich, dass die interdisziplinäre Orientierung 
der verhaltensökonomischen Forschung über soziale Präferenzen diverse Probleme mit 
sich bringt. 
Ein kurzer Exkurs in die aktuellen Fragestellungen der Forschung zum sozio-
ökonomischen Status, soll auf der einen Seite noch einmal die Wichtigkeit der sozialen 
Struktur als möglichen Steuerungsmechanismus sozialer Präferenzen herausstellen. Auf 
der anderen Seite soll hierdurch ein interdisziplinäres Forschungsprojekt, Occupational 
Ethology (Wallner et al., 2008 ) vorgestellt werden.
Ziel dieses Projektes ist es, genau an der Schnittstelle zwischen Kooperation und 
Wettbewerb in der Hierarchie zu forschen und soziale Strategien und deren Folgen zu 
erklären.
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